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#### Interpretation-The affirmative is limited to defending the adoption of statutory or judicial restrictions

#### 1.should means the debate is about USFG policy change

Ericson 2003 Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### 2. Resolved with a colon indicates policy

Army Officer School ’04 (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A *formal* resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### Vote negative

#### Limits--- there are an infinite number of affs when you can advocate the plan as a thought experiment and garner advantages based on individual activism. This destroys research and dialogue

Hanghoj 2008

Thorkild, researcher for the Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

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COUNTERPLAN

#### The United States federal government amend The 2001 Authorization of Use of Military Force to do the following

#### -subject the authorization to legislative review and renewal every two years.

#### -clarifies the international law of self-defense requires a rigorous imminence, necessity and proportionality analysis, and that the use of cross-border military force should be reserved for situations in which there is concrete evidence of grave threats to the United States or our allies that cannot be addressed through other means

#### -Create a non-partisan blue ribbon commission made up of senior experts on international law, national security, human rights, foreign policy and counterterrorism to review intelligence reports and conduct a thorough policy review of past and current targeted killing policy, evaluating the risk of setting international precedents, the impact of US targeted killing policy on allies, and the impact on broader US counterterrorism goals and follow the advice of the commission.

#### CP re-establishes the threshold for the use of force-aligns US policy with international law

Brooks 13 (Rosa Brooks Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, “The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights,” <http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/04-23-13BrooksTestimony.pdf>)

4. The Constitution gives Congress the power to “define and punish offenses against the law of nations.” Without tying the president’s hands, Congress can pass a resolution clarifying that the international law of self-defense requires a rigorous imminence, necessity and proportionality analysis, and that the use of cross-border military force should be reserved for situations in which there is concrete evidence of grave threats to the United States or our allies that cannot be addressed through other means. 5. Congress and/or the Executive branch should create a non-partisan blue ribbon commission made up of senior experts on international law, national security, human rights, foreign policy and counterterrorism. Commission members should have or receive the necessary clearances to review intelligence reports and conduct a thorough policy review of past and current targeted killing policy, evaluating the risk of setting international precedents, the impact of US targeted killing policy on allies, and the impact on broader US counterterrorism goals. In the absence of a judicial review mechanism, such a commission might also be tasked with reviewing particular strikes to determine whether any errors or abuses have taken place. The commission should release a public, unclassified report as well as a classified report made available to executive branch and congressional officials, and the report should continue detailed recommendations, including, if applicable, recommendations for changes in law and policy and recommendations for further action of any sort, including, potentially, compensation for civilians harmed by US drone strikes. The unclassified report should contain as few redactions as possible

Sunset solves

Chesney et al 13 (Robert Chesney is a professor at the University of Texas School of Law, a nonresident senior fellow of the Brookings Institution, and a distinguished scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law. “Is the "War on Terror" Lawful?,” http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/141091)

4. Sunset Finally, to head off the possibility – or the perception – that Congress is authorizing a perpetual war against an undefined series of groups, the entire regime should sunset after a statutorily defined period of years. Once force is authorized, there is tremendous political incentive not to revoke that authorization – a step that has implications for ongoing operations, as well as for the nation’s sense of itself as at war. To ensure continual reassessment of the need for authorized force, the authorization should be subject to legislative review and renewal (say, every two years), with a default sunset if Congress does not affirmatively renew the granted authority. In the event of a sunset, the legal basis for detentions pursuant to the conflict might evaporate, so the statute would have to address whether and how existing detentions could be extended following a sunset. IV. Conclusion As the AUMF becomes obsolete, we are approaching the end point of statutory authority for the President to meet emergent terrorist threats. There are significant downside risks to any successor legal regime to the AUMF and to the option of doing nothing. We have argued that the approach of statutory criteria and listing described above is the least bad option for the country to meet emerging terrorist threats. But at a broader level what is most important is that any legal reform should take account of lessons from the past twelve years’ experience operating under the AUMF. Our broadest aim has been to provide a menu of options for incorporating those lessons into any new legislation that emerges.

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Repealing the AUMF collapses the war on terrorism and targeted killing operations

Stimson 13 (Charles Stimson, Senior Fellow and Manager, National Security Law Program The Heritage Foundation, 3/16. “Law of Armed Conflict and the Use of Military Force,” http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2013/05/the-law-of-armed-conflict)

As to the Committee’s question regarding the geographic scope of the AUMF, both administrations have taken the unremarkable position that by its terms, and in practice, there is no geographic limit or scope to the AUMF. Rather, the AUMF gives the President the authority to confront the enemy wherever he deems the enemy resides. Just last year, in a major address at Northwestern University, Attorney General Eric Holder stated, “Our legal authority is not limited to the battlefields in Afghanistan. Indeed, neither Congress nor our federal courts have limited the geographic scope of our ability to use force to the current conflict in Afghanistan.”[9] The notion that we are at war, and that the war (and by implication the AUMF) has no geographical boundaries is anathema to some, but is nevertheless lawful and consistent with the law of armed conflict and our national and international obligations. It is also not the boundless source of tyranny and infringement upon other nations’ s overeignty that detractors profess; rather, the national security power of the politically accountable branches are subject to all of the checks and balances within our constitutional form of government, as well as the more modern checks detailed by fellow witness Jack Goldsmith in his book Power and Constraint. And it is commensurate, in this case, with the enemy, an international terrorist movement that does not respect political or any other boundaries and that considers the people and assets of the United States and its allies, wherever they may be, to be its targets. As to the Committee’s question regarding whether the AUMF should be modified, or by implication repealed, I would suggest that repealing the AUMF prematurely would be unwise. Repealing the AUMF would signal, legally, that the war against al Qaeda is over, at a time when al Qaeda and associated forces continue in fact to wage war against the United States. And it may have more specific consequences, for example, involving the continued detention of those terrorists currently in captivity and not subject to military commission or federal court proceedings. Repealing or substantially narrowing the existing AUMF could also have substantial repercussions on other sensitive operations, including but not limited to the targeted killing program. In short, the current AUMF should remain in place unless and until the narrow class of persons under its scope no longer poses a substantial threat to our national security. Keeping the current AUMF does not authorize a permanent state of war, as some critics have alleged. It merely retains the legal framework that has worked and served us well, to date, and acknowledges that those subject to the AUMF, although greatly diminished in number and efficacy, should not be allowed to regain their footing. In the context of the AUMF, keeping the AUMF as is does not necessarily mean that the Executive Branch, this one or the next, will want to or need to employ the full extent of its authority. We cannot foresee with precision when or if the threats posed by those subject to the narrow jurisdiction of the AUMF will be defeated or become so insignificant as to not warrant this particular AUMF.

#### Key to solve terrorism

Anderson 13 (Kenneth, professor of international law at Washington College of Law, American University, Washington, visiting fellow at Hoover “The Case for Drones,” http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/05/24/the\_case\_for\_drones\_118548-full.html)

Other critics argue that drone warfare is ineffective because killing one operational commander merely means that another rises to take his place. This is the source of the oft-heard remark that drone warfare is a “whack-a-mole” strategy: Kill one here and another pops up there. Drone warfare is nothing more than a tactic masquerading as a strategy, it is said. Worse, it indulges one of the oldest and most seductive quests of modern military technology, the one that says you can win a war from the air alone. The whack-a-mole criticism is wildly overstated and, as a matter of terrorist leadership, simply not true. Captured terrorist communications show that qualified and experienced operational commanders are not so easy to come by. One can argue that the failure to carry off large-scale attacks in the West is the result of the defensive hardening of targets and better homeland security, which is certainly true; but culling the ranks of terrorist leaders and the resulting inability to plan another 9/11 is also critical. Drone warfare today is integrated with a much larger strategic counterterrorism target—one in which, as in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, radical Islamist groups seize governance of whole populations and territories and provide not only safe haven, but also an honored central role to transnational terrorist groups. This is what current conflicts in Yemen and Mali threaten, in counterterrorism terms, and why the United States, along with France and even the UN, has moved to intervene militarily. Drone warfare is just one element of overall strategy, but it has a clear utility in disrupting terrorist leadership. It makes the planning and execution of complex plots difficult if only because it is hard to plan for years down the road if you have some reason to think you will be struck down by a drone but have no idea when. The unpredictability and terrifying anticipation of sudden attack, which terrorists have acknowledged in communications, have a significant impact on planning and organizational effectiveness.

#### Will target undersea cables-they have the means

**Krepinevich, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments president, 2011**

(Andrew, “The Terrorist Threat Beneath the Waves”, 11-2, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203687504577005811739173268.html>, ldg)

This vast infrastructure was built with the assumption that while it would have to weather natural disasters, it would not be a target in war. In military parlance, much of the infrastructure comprises "soft" targets that would not require much in the way of explosives to cause significant, and perhaps catastrophic, damage. Fortunately many of these targets have not been easy to reach—until now. This brings us to the second development: the diffusion of military technology and weaponry that can threaten the undersea economy with a new form of commerce raiding. In recent years, Latin-American narco-cartels have begun moving their cargo by submarine. While not even remotely in a class with the U.S. Navy's submarines, these simple boats are nevertheless capable of operating undersea in littoral waters while moving tons of cocaine. They have a range of up to 2,000 miles and cost but a few million dollars to build. These submarines can submerge to depths of a few dozen feet, which is sufficient to make detection difficult, allowing them to approach offshore oil platforms with little or no warning. Even more disturbing is the proliferation of unmanned underwater vehicles, or UUVs, which were once almost exclusively operated by Western militaries. With the growth of the undersea economy, civilian development and production took off in the 1980s. UUVs are now widely used for a variety of commercial and scientific purposes. These UUVs are perhaps best known for their role in locating sunken ships. Unlike the small submarines operated by narco-cartels, UUVs can descend to the ocean floor. If adapted for military purposes, they could carry mines and other explosives, as well as cameras and electronic sensors. They are also becoming cheaper, with a wide variety of systems available for sale in the private sector. Then there are naval mines, now manufactured in more than 30 countries. Some producers, like Russia, are developing mines with better sensors, target-recognition systems, stealthy coatings, and self-propulsion systems to enable them to move about. But mines don't need to be sophisticated to be effective, especially against the thousands of soft targets populating the continental shelf. While narco-cartels are interested in making money, not war, this is not the case with radical nonstate entities or their state sponsors. Some groups, including al Qaeda, seek to achieve victory not by defeating their enemies on the battlefield but by inflicting unacceptable pain or damage, either against defenseless civilians or economic infrastructure. Toward this end, radical Islamists have undertaken attacks, employing far less sophisticated means and with minimal success, on an oil tanker in the Gulf of Aden in October 2002 and Saudi oil production facilities in February 2006. Should the U.S. find itself in a confrontation with Iran, it might employ proxies to achieve similar ends. For a relatively small effort on their part, in short, America's enemies could potentially impose enormous costs on its undersea economy, including loss of energy resources, damaged infrastructure and environmental degradation.

#### Undersea cables are the lynchpin of the global economy and US warfighting

**Matis, USNA commander and Master in Strategic Studies, 2012**

(Michael, “The Protection of Undersea Cables: A Global Security Threat”, July, online pdf, ldg)

Undersea cables are a valuable commodity in the 21st century global communication environment. The undersea consortium is owned by various international companies such as ATT, and these companies provide high-speed broadband connectivity and capacity for large geographic areas that are important entities of trade and communications around the globe.41 For example, the U.S. Clearing House Interbank Payment System processes in excess of $1 trillion a day for investment companies, securities and commodities exchange organizations, banks, and other financial institutions from more than 22 countries.42 The majority of their transactions are transmitted via undersea cables. In addition, the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) net-centric warfare and Global Information Grid rely on the same undersea cables that service the information and economic spheres.43 If undersea cables were cut or disrupted outside of the U.S. territorial waters, even for a few hours, the capability of modern U.S warfare that encompasses battle space communications and awareness, protection, and the stability of the financial networks would be at risk. As one analyst has noted, “the increase demand is being driven primarily from data traffic that is becoming an integral part of the everyday telecommunications infrastructure and has no boundaries.44 Maintaining the viability of these cables is extremely important. An example of the magnitude of data that reaches the international market every day is demonstrated by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT), which is the global provider of secure financial messaging services.45 This organization transmits financial data between 208 countries via undersea fiber optic cables.46 In addition, the security of international transactions via undersea cables could create chaos for global markets if the cables linking U.S., Europe and/or Asia were cut. The disproportionate importance of these cables to the nation’s communication infrastructure cannot be overestimated. If all of these cables were suddenly cut, only seven percent of the U. S. traffic could be restored using every single satellite in the sky.47 Satellites were important to the global communication industry but, were overtaken by undersea fiber-optic cable technology in terms of volume and/or capacity amongst users in 1986.48 There is a misconception amongst telephone, cell phones, and internet recipients around the globe that believe satellites are the primary means of communicating. There are significant limitations utilizing satellites as an efficient means of communication. Finn and Yang, note that satellites take a quarter of a second for signals to make the round trip to and from a geostationary orbit 22,000 miles above the Earth and one bounce is enough to throw off the verbal timing of a conversation. Also, the transmission quality of the satellite system could be erratic with echoes, screeches or dead-air calls.49 A major portion of DoD data traveling on undersea cables is unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) video. In 2010, UAVs flew 190,000 hours, and the Air Force estimates that it will need more than one million UAV hours annually to be prepared for future wars.50 The Department of State and its diplomatic and consular posts are also heavily dependent on uninterrupted global undersea cable traffic. The importance of these cables makes them a potential target for other states or terrorists.

#### Regardless of relative power, military operations solve all conflict.

Kagan and O’Hanlon 7

Frederick Kagan and Michael O’Hanlon, Fred’s a resident scholar at AEI, Michael is a senior fellow in foreign policy at Brookings, “The Case for Larger Ground Forces”, April 24, 2007, <http://www.aei.org/files/2007/04/24/20070424_Kagan20070424.pdf>

We live at a time when wars not only rage in nearly every region but threaten to erupt in many places where the current relative calm is tenuous. To view this as a strategic military challenge for the United States is not to espouse a specific theory of America’s role in the world or a certain political philosophy. Such an assessment flows directly from the basic bipartisan view of American foreign policy makers since World War II that overseas threats must be countered before they can directly threaten this country’s shores, that the basic stability of the international system is essential to American peace and prosperity, and that no country besides the United States is in a position to lead the way in countering major challenges to the global order. Let us highlight the threats and their consequences with a few concrete examples, emphasizing those that involve key strategic regions of the world such as the Persian Gulf and East Asia, or key potential threats to American security, such as the spread of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of the global Al Qaeda/jihadist movement. The Iranian government has rejected a series of international demands to halt its efforts at enriching uranium and submit to international inspections. What will happen if the US—or Israeli—government becomes convinced that Tehran is on the verge of fielding a nuclear weapon? North Korea, of course, has already done so, and the ripple effects are beginning to spread. Japan’s recent election to supreme power of a leader who has promised to rewrite that country’s constitution to support increased armed forces—and, possibly, even nuclear weapons— may well alter the delicate balance of fear in Northeast Asia fundamentally and rapidly. Also, in the background, at least for now, SinoTaiwanese tensions continue to flare, as do tensions between India and Pakistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Venezuela and the United States, and so on. Meanwhile, the world’s nonintervention in Darfur troubles consciences from Europe to America’s Bible Belt to its bastions of liberalism, yet with no serious international forces on offer, the bloodletting will probably, tragically, continue unabated. And as bad as things are in Iraq today, they could get worse. What would happen if the key Shiite figure, Ali al Sistani, were to die? If another major attack on the scale of the Golden Mosque bombing hit either side (or, perhaps, both sides at the same time)? Such deterioration might convince many Americans that the war there truly was lost—but the costs of reaching such a conclusion would be enormous. Afghanistan is somewhat more stable for the moment, although a major Taliban offensive appears to be in the offing. Sound US grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that, over the next few years and decades, the world is going to be a very unsettled and quite dangerous place, with Al Qaeda and its associated groups as a subset of a much larger set of worries. The only serious response to this international environment is to develop armed forces capable of protecting America’s vital interests throughout this dangerous time. Doing so requires a military capable of a wide range of missions—including not only deterrence of great power conflict in dealing with potential hotspots in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Persian Gulf but also associated with a variety of Special Forces activities and stabilization operations. For today’s US military, which already excels at high technology and is increasingly focused on re-learning the lost art of counterinsurgency, this is first and foremost a question of finding the resources to field a large-enough standing Army and Marine Corps to handle personnel intensive missions such as the ones now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan.

**Nuclear terrorism is likely-means and motive**

**Luongo et al., Partnership for Global Security president, 2012**

(Kenneth, “Nuclear Terrorism: A Clear Danger”, 3-15, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/opinion/nuclear-terrorism-a-clear-danger.html?_r=1&>, ldg)

Terrorists exploit gaps in security. The current global regime for protecting the nuclear materials that terrorists desire for their ultimate weapon is far from seamless. It is based largely on unaccountable, voluntary arrangements that are inconsistent across borders. Its weak links make it dangerous and inadequate to prevent nuclear terrorism. Later this month in Seoul, the more than 50 world leaders who will gather for the second Nuclear Security Summit need to seize the opportunity to start developing an accountable regime to prevent nuclear terrorism. There is a consensus among international leaders that the threat of nuclear terrorism is real, not a Hollywood confection. President Obama, the leaders of 46 other nations, the heads of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations, and numerous experts have called nuclear terrorism one of the most serious threats to global security and stability. It is also preventable with more aggressive action. At least four terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, have demonstrated interest in using a nuclear device. These groups operate in or near states with histories of questionable nuclear security practices. Terrorists do not need to steal a nuclear weapon. It is quite possible to make an improvised nuclear device from highly enriched uranium or plutonium being used for civilian purposes. And there is a black market in such material. There have been 18 confirmed thefts or loss of weapons-usable nuclear material. In 2011, the Moldovan police broke up part of a smuggling ring attempting to sell highly enriched uranium; one member is thought to remain at large with a kilogram of this material. A terrorist nuclear explosion could kill hundreds of thousands, create billions of dollars in damages and undermine the global economy. Former Secretary General Kofi Annan of the United Nations said that an act of nuclear terrorism “would thrust tens of millions of people into dire poverty” and create “a second death toll throughout the developing world.” Surely after such an event, global leaders would produce a strong global system to ensure nuclear security. There is no reason to wait for a catastrophe to build such a system. The conventional wisdom is that domestic regulations, U.N. Security Council resolutions, G-8 initiatives, I.A.E.A. activities and other voluntary efforts will prevent nuclear terrorism. But existing global arrangements for nuclear security lack uniformity and coherence. There are no globally agreed standards for effectively securing nuclear material. There is no obligation to follow the voluntary standards that do exist and no institution, not even the I.A.E.A., with a mandate to evaluate nuclear security performance. This patchwork approach provides the appearance of dealing with nuclear security; the reality is there are gaps through which a determined terrorist group could drive one or more nuclear devices.

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Civil society is not neutral---the site of deliberation they seek to invigorate presupposes an equal access to the political which is not true due to the privileging of masculinity in their politics; the distinction they create between the ‘public’ and ‘private’ sphere is a false one meant to hide women from politics maintaining hierarchy and oppression

This is a prior question to assessing the psychological impacts of the 1AC which are all premised on this conversation being a useful one---we must first interrogate the terms of the debate

Fraser 90 (Nancy, PhD, Professor of Political and Social Science and professor of philosophy at The New School in New York City, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,” http://api.ning.com/files/hRwSaOzKhGD-wGyDZuJeNffJvQrETo9IizI7bNRisAQ\_/RethinkingthePublicSphere.pdf)

Now, let me juxtapose to this sketch of Habermas's account an alternative account that I shall piece together from some recent revisionist historiography. Briefly, scholars like Joan Landes, Mary Ryan, and Geoff Eley contend that Habermas's account idealizes the liberal public sphere. They argue that, despite the rhetoric of publicity and accessibility, that official public sphere rested on, indeed was importantly constituted by, a number of significant exclusions. For Landes, the key axis of exclusion is gender; she argues that the ethos of the new republican public sphere in France was constructed in deliberate opposition to that of a more woman- friendly salon culture that the republicans stigmatized as "artificial," "effeminate," and "aristocratic." Consequently, a new, austere style of public speech and behavior was promoted, a style deemed "rational," "virtuous," and "manly." In this way, masculinist gender constructs were built into the very conception of the republican public sphere, as was a logic that led, at the height of Jacobin rule, to the formal exclusion from political life of women.4 Here the republicans drew on classical traditions that cast femininity and publicity as oxymorons; the depth of such traditions can be gauged in the etymological connection between "public" and "pubic," a graphic trace of the fact that in the ancient world possession of a penis was a requirement for speaking in public. (A similar link is preserved, incidentally, in the etymological connection between "testimony" and "testicle.")5 Extending Landes's argument, Geoff Eley contends that exclusionary operations were essential to liberal public spheres not only in France but also in England and Germany, and that in all these countries gender exclusions were linked to other exclusions rooted in processes of class formation. In all these countries, he claims, the soil that nourished the liberal public sphere was "civil society," the emerging new congeries of voluntary associations that sprung up in what came to be known as "the age of societies." But this network of clubs and associations-philanthropic, civic, professional, and cultural-was anything but accessible to everyone. On the contrary, it was the arena, the training ground, and eventually the power base of a stratum of bourgeois men, who were coming to see themselves as a "universal class" and preparing to assert their fitness to govern. Thus, the elaboration of a distinctive culture of civil society and of an associated public sphere was implicated in the process of bourgeois class formation; its practices and ethos were markers of "distinction" in Pierre Bourdieu's sense,6 ways of defining an emergent elite, setting it off from the older aristocratic elites it was intent on displacing, on the one hand, and from the various popular and plebeian strata it aspired to rule, on the other. This process of distinction, more- over, helps explain the exacerbation of sexism characteristic of the liberal public sphere; new gender norms enjoining feminine domesticity and a sharp separation of public and private spheres functioned as key signifiers of bourgeois difference from both higher and lower social strata. It is a measure of the eventual success of this bourgeois project that these norms later became hegemonic, sometimes imposed on, sometimes embraced by, broader segments of society.7 Now, there is a remarkable irony here, one that Habermas's account of the rise of the public sphere fails fully to appreciate.8 A discourse of publicity touting accessibility, rationality, and the suspension of status hierarchies is itself deployed as a strategy of distinction. Of course, in and of itself, this irony does not fatally compromise the discourse of publicity; that discourse can be, indeed has been, differently deployed in different circumstances and contexts. Nevertheless, it does suggest that the relationship between publicity and status is more complex than Habermas intimates, that declaring a deliberative arena to be a space where extant status distinctions are bracketed and neutralized is not sufficient to make it so. Moreover, the problem is not only that Habermas idealizes the liberal public sphere but also that he fails to examine other, nonliberal, non-bourgeois, competing public spheres. Or rather, it is precisely because he fails to examine these other public spheres that he ends up idealizing the liberal public sphere.9 Mary Ryan documents the variety of ways in which nineteenth century North American women of various classes and ethnicities constructed access routes to public political life, even despite their exclusion from the official public sphere. In the case of elite bourgeois women, this involved building a counter-civil society of alternative woman-only voluntary associations, including philanthropic and moral reform societies; in some respects, these associations aped the all-male societies built by these women's fathers and grandfathers; yet in other respects the women were innovating, since they creatively used the here- tofore quintessentially "private" idioms of domesticity and motherhood precisely as springboards for public activity. Meanwhile, for some less privileged women, access to public life came through participation in supporting roles in male-dominated working class protest activities. Still other women found public outlets in street protests and parades. Finally, women's rights advocates publicly contested both women's exclusion from the official public sphere and the privatization of gender politics.'0 Ryan's study shows that, even in the absence of formal political incorporation through suffrage, there were a variety of ways of accessing public life and a multiplicity of public arenas. Thus, the view that women were excluded from the public sphere turns out to be ideological; it rests on a class- and gender-biased notion of publicity, one which accepts at face value the bourgeois public's claim to be the public. In fact, the historiography of Ryan and others demonstrates that the bourgeois public was never the public. On the contrary, virtually contemporaneous with the bourgeois public there arose a host of competing counterpublics, including nationalist publics, popular peasant publics, elite women's publics, and working class publics. Thus, there were competing publics from the start, not just from the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as Habermas implies." Moreover, not only were there were always a plurality of competing publics but the relations between bourgeois publics and other publics were always conflictual. Virtually from the beginning, counterpublics contested the exclusionary norms of the bourgeois public, elaborating alternative styles of political behavior and alternative norms of public speech. Bourgeois publics, in turn, excoriated these alternatives and deliberately sought to block broader participation. As Eley puts it, "the emergence of a bourgeois public was never defined solely by the struggle against absolutism and traditional authority, but..addressed the problem of popular containment as well. The public sphere was always constituted by conflict."12 In general, this revisionist historiography suggests a much darker view of the bourgeois public sphere than the one that emerges from Habermas's study. The exclusions and conflicts that appeared as accidental trappings from his perspective, in the revisionists' view become constitutive. The result is a gestalt switch that alters the very meaning of the public sphere. We can no longer assume that the bourgeois conception of the public sphere was simply an unrealized utopian ideal; it was also a masculinist ideological notion that functioned to legitimate an emergent form of class rule. Therefore, Eley draws a Gramscian moral from the story: the official bourgeois public sphere is the institutional vehicle for a major historical transformation in the nature of political domination. This is the shift from a repressive mode of domination to a hegemonic one, from rule based primarily on acquiescence to superior force to rule based primarily on consent supplemented with some measure of repression.13 The important point is that this new mode of political domination, like the older one, secures the ability of one stratum of society to rule the rest. The official public sphere, then, was-indeed, is-the prime institutional site for the construction of the consent that defines the new, hegemonic mode of domination.14

#### Vote negative to problematize their mode of communication---only through critique of the principals of universality and the unitary subject can we truly achieve politicization

Travers 90 (Ann Travers, B.A. Simon Fraser University, “The Invisible Woman: A Feminist Critique of Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action,” <https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/handle/2429/29857/UBC_1990_A8%20T72.pdf?sequence=1>)

Habermas makes a good case for the need to revitalize the public sphere. From a feminist perspective this is not problematic in principle. In fact, it is highly desirable and necessary. However, the nature of the public sphere and boundaries between the public sphere and the private must be revised. The first thing that a feminist conception of the public sphere must involve is the centrality of individual agency in deciding what is to be personal. The personal must therefore be understood as an individual's right to privacy. The second principle guiding a feminist conception of the public sphere is the need to allow for a multiplicity of forms of expression, not just sober, rational, discussion. As Iris Young insists, the distinction between public and private should not reflect an opposition between reason and affectivity and desire, or between universal and particular (Young, 1987: 73). Instead, the public realm must welcome affectivity. passion and play. Of central importance, universality and impartiality must not be the guiding principles of the public sphere. A consensus orientation overlooks particularity and partiality and assumes that there is something universal which underlies all our differences. Again, this universality alludes to a conception of neutrality which is artificial and reflective of power configurations. The pursuit of compromise with the awareness of difference is a far more constructive goal. In short, a feminist perspective necessitates the abandonment of these liberal humanist ideals and the social, economic, and political configuration of modernity.

### 1NC

MIDTERMS DA

#### Democrats will take back the House now – shutdown.

LaRosa 10/1/13

Michael, Polls show opportunity for Dems in 2014, MSNBC, http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/10/01/polls-show-opportunity-for-dems-in-2014/

The polls show that the majority Americans will blame the GOP—not President Obama—for a federal government shutdown. The CNN/ORC poll out Monday shows that 46% of Americans would blame Republicans for a shutdown, compared to 36% who would blame the president. The public’s sentiment is similar to what was seen on the eve of the last government shutdown in 1995 when voters believed Republicans were to blame for impasse rather than President Clinton. Americans exercised their frustration two years later at the ballot box by re-electing Clinton by 9 points. Did the GOP not learn the lessons of history? “Republicans know this is a loser for them,” said former Utah Gov. John Huntsman on Meet the Press. “So Republicans are going to have to learn the lessons of this whole episode and that will be you can’t have an all-or-nothing approach,” he said. Hillary Clinton even weighed in on the GOP’s tactics. She took her most partisan tone yet since leaving the State Department. “I think they ought to go back and read history,” Clinton told a panel at the Clinton Global Initiative in New York last week. “Because I will just say that it wouldn’t be the worst thing for Democrats if they try to shut government down,” she said. “We’ve seen that movie before.” The Republicans may have given the Democrats their only window of hope to take back Congress in the 2014 midterm election. The pattern of second-term midterm elections since World War II, in which five out of six times the party holding the White House has gotten clobbered in the House or Senate, or both. But, according to the latest NBC/Wall Street Journal poll, Democrats had a three-point advantage on a generic ballot prior to pre-shutdown hysteria, with 46% of voters favoring Democrats over 43% for Republicans. Democrats are quietly hoping they can leverage anger at the Republicans into votes next November. “The study contained a mountain of data, but what grabbed my attention were the results in each of the three groups on the generic congressional ballot question,” says Charlie Cook of Cook Political Report. “While this poll question cannot project how many seats each side will win, it is a useful—if rough—indicator of whether the partisan winds are blowing, and if they are, in what direction and with what intensity.” Tuesday’s new Quinnipiac University poll released more good news for Democrats. The poll shows Democrats have a 9-point lead in the congressional generic ballot (43% to 34%) taking the largest lead in the generic ballot so far this election cycle. David Wasserman, editor for Cook Political Report, told Hardball Monday that Democrats will have to perform better than that if they expect to take back the House in 2014. “We have calculated that Democrats would need to win all votes cast for House by at least 6.8% over Republicans in order to win the barest possible majority, 218 seats,” said Wasserman. “In other words, Democrats would need to win more than 53% of all major-party votes cast for House to take back control,” he said. According to the Quinnipiac Poll, voters oppose Congress shutting down the federal government to block implementation of the Affordable Care Act by a 72 – 22% margin. American voters also disapprove 74-17% of the job Republicans in Congress are doing, their lowest score ever. These are the kind of numbers Democrats are hoping will rally voters to their side come next November. Enthusiasm against what is going on in Washington is with Democrats for now, but the intensity at which voters will rally out of opposition to a shutdown and blame Republicans is still to be determined.

#### The plan would obliterate the careers of any politician who goes along with it

**Ferguson, Harvard professor, 2009**

(Niall, “The Case for Restraint”, <http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=335>, ldg)

So much for the American predicament. What of Posen’s alternative grand strategy based on American self-restraint? The terms he uses are themselves revealing. The United States needs to be more “reticent” about its use of military force, more “modest” about its political goals overseas, more “distant” from traditional allies, and more “stingy” in its aid policies. Good luck to the presidential candidate who laces his next foreign policy speech with those adjectives: “My fellow Americans, I want to make this great country of ours more reticent, modest, distant and stingy!” Let us, however, leave aside this quintessentially academic and operationally useless rhetoric. What exactly does Posen want the United States to do? I count six concrete recommendations. The United States should: 1) Abandon the Bush Doctrine of “preemption”, which in the case of Iraq has been a policy of preventive war. Posen argues that this applies even in cases of nuclear proliferation. By implication, he sees preventive war as an inferior option to deterrence, though he does not make clear how exactly a nuclear-armed Iran would be deterred, least of all if his second recommendation were to be implemented. 2) Reduce U.S. military presence in the Middle East (“the abode of Islam”) by abandoning “its permanent and semi-permanent land bases in Arab countries.” Posen does not say so, but he appears to imply the abandonment of all these bases, not just the ones in Iraq, but also those in, for example, Qatar. It is not clear what would be left of Central Command after such a drastic retreat. Note that this would represent a break with the policy not just of the last two Presidents, but with that of the last 12. 3) Ramp up efforts to provide relief in the wake of natural disasters, exemplified by Operation Unified Assistance after the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004. No doubt the American military did some good in the wake of the tsunami, but Posen needs to explain why a government that so miserably bungled the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina less than a year later should be expected to be consistently effective in the wake of natural disasters. 4) Assist in humanitarian military interventions only “under reasonable guidelines” and “in coalitions, operating under some kind of regional or international political mandate.” Does Posen mean that he would favor sending American troops to Darfur at the same time as he is withdrawing them from other “abodes of Islam?” He does not say. 5) Promote not democracy abroad but “the rule of law, press freedom and the rights of collective bargaining.” Here again I am experiencing cognitive dissonance. The government that sought systematically to evade the Geneva Conventions in order to detain indefinitely and torture suspected terrorists as an upholder of the rule of law? 6) Stop offering “U.S. security guarantees and security assistance, [which] tend to relieve others of the need to do more to ensure their own security.” This is in fact the most important of all Posen’s recommendations, though he saves it until last. He envisages radical diminution of American support for other members of NATO. Over the next ten years, he writes, the United States “should gradually withdraw from all military headquarters and commands in Europe.” In the same timeframe it should “reduce U.S. government direct financial assistance to Israel to zero”, as well as reducing (though not wholly eliminating) assistance to Egypt. And it should “reconsider its security relationship with Japan”, whatever that means. Again, this represents a break with traditional policy so radical that it would impress even Noam Chomsky, to say nothing of Osama bin Laden (who would, indeed, find little here to object to). Posen, in other words, has proceeded from relatively familiar premises (the limits of American “hyperpower”) to some quite fantastic policy recommendations, which are perhaps best summed up as a cross between isolationism and humanitarianism. Only slightly less fantastic than his vision of an American military retreat from the Middle East, Europe and East Asia is Posen’s notion that it could be sold to the American electorate—just six years after they were the targets of the single largest terrorist attack in history—in the language of self-effacement. Coming from a man who wants to restart mainstream debate on American grand strategy, that is pretty rich.

#### Democratic Congress leads to multiple solutions to warming that solve and cement climate leadership

**Purvis et al., German Marshall Fund senior fellow, 2013**

(Nigel, “Setting the New U.S. Climate and Clean Energy Agenda”, 5-14, <http://blog.gmfus.org/2013/05/14/setting-the-new-u-s-climate-and-clean-energy-agenda/>, ldg)

In early May, scientists stationed at a national observatory in Hawaii announced a new milestone in human history — that the world has crossed a potentially catastrophic global warming threshold (atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations of 400 parts per million). This announcement reiterates the precarious state of the global climate and the need for ambitious global action. Four months into U.S. President Barack Obama’s second term, however, the outlook for U.S. domestic action and leadership on climate change remains unclear. On one hand, recent projections of U.S. emissions show that the United States — through a mix of major clean energy policies, slow economic growth, and abundant, cheap natural gas — is likely to achieve the significant emission reductions President Obama promised in late 2009. On the other hand, the sluggish economy, rising budget deficits, Congressional divisions, and other factors continue to press against further strong U.S. climate action at home or abroad. Internationally, many nations increasingly see the Obama administration as falling short of its climate goals. In reality, the United States has delivered on short-term promises regarding emission reductions and international climate assistance to developing nations. But domestic U.S. policies have so far lacked long-term vision and clear leadership, and, while the slight decline in U.S. emissions over the past few years is welcome news, those reductions are not at the scale necessary to spur stronger global action in line with climate science. What more might the United States realistically do given slow-moving global climate talks and a polarized, dysfunctional domestic climate and energy policy? The following expected and possible domestic policies are most likely to produce politically viable solutions with real emissions impacts in the next few years. Clean Air Act Expansion: If optimally implemented, new power plant efficiency standards could achieve emissions reductions of 90 million tons of CO2 per year, or roughly 1.4 percent of total U.S. emissions. If applied to existing power plants, the single largest source of U.S. emissions, these regulations would have a significant impact on greenhouse gas emissions in the long run. Aviation: United States aviation activities are responsible for approximately 40 percent of global aviation emissions. U.S. participation in a global framework for domestic aviation regulations could promote responsible growth of the aviation sector, which, on its current track, is projected to quadruple its carbon emissions by 2050. Renewable Energy Incentives: Fossil fuel subsidies continue to outstrip renewable energy subsidies by a ratio of six to one. Long-term incentives for developing renewable energy bring increasing climate benefits. For example, long-term extension of the wind production tax credit could offset over 170 million tons of CO2 over the next five years, equal to 2.5 percent of current emissions. Natural Gas Industry Regulations: According to the EPA, in 2010, the natural gas industry emitted just over 3 percent of the United States’ total greenhouse gas emissions through leaking methane, throwing into question the net climate benefits of a transition to natural gas. Consequently, emissions regulations for natural gas infrastructure will emerge as a focus of U.S. domestic climate action. Carbon Capture and Sequestration: Deployment of carbon capture and sequestration technology (CCS) may have direct and rapid impacts on U.S. emissions. For now, CCS technologies remain mostly unproven at scale, but are a promising method of addressing U.S. emissions. Carbon Tax: Despite current political infeasibility, several proposals for carbon pricing policies have already been introduced in this session of Congress. Over time, if U.S. budget deficits continue to grow and if Europe recovers from its sovereign debt crisis, bond markets may begin to pull back from U.S. treasury securities. Rising borrowing costs for the United States could push U.S. policymakers to adopt a variety of austerity measures and new taxes, including possibly a carbon tax. Given the clear consensus among scientists that the world is not doing enough to leave the path to catastrophic climate change by 2020, the world looks to the United States for action. Contrary to perceptions of political inaction on climate change, the United States has not only already driven down its emissions, but also has several opportunities to step up climate leadership and win further emissions reductions.

#### Extinction

Hansen 2011 - is member of the National Academy of Sciences, an adjunct professor in the Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences at Columbia University and at Columbia’s Earth Institute, and director of the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies (James E, “Storms of my Grandchildren”)

As long as the total movement of isotherms toward the poles is much smaller than the size of the habitat, or the ranges in which the animals live, the effect on species is limited. But now the move­ment is inexorably toward the poles and totals more than one hun­dred miles over the past several decades. If greenhouse gases continue to increase at business-as-usual rates, then the rate of isotherm movement will double in this century to at least seventy miles per decade. Species at the most immediate risk are those in polar climates and the biologically diverse slopes of alpine regions. Polar animals, in effect, will be pushed off the planet. Alpine species will be pushed toward higher altitudes, and toward smaller, rockier areas with thinner air; thus, in effect, they will also be pushed off the planet. A few such species, such as polar bears, no doubt will be "rescued" by human beings, but survival in zoos or managed animal reserves will be small consolation to bears or nature lovers. Earth's history provides an invaluable perspective about what is possible. Fossils in the geologic record reveal that there have been five mass extinctions during the past five hundred million years— geologically brief periods in which about half or more of the species on Earth disappeared forever. In each case, life survived and new species developed over hundreds of thousands and millions of years. All these mass extinctions were associated with large and relatively rapid changes of atmospheric composition and climate. In the most extreme extinction, the "end-Permian" event, dividing the Permian Triassic periods 251 million years ago, nearly all life on Earth— more than 90 percent of terrestrial and marine species—was exterminated. None of the extinction events is understood in full. Research is active, as increasingly powerful methods of "reading the rocks" are being developed. Yet enough is now known to provide an invalu­able perspective for what is already being called the sixth mass ex­tinction, the human-caused destruction of species. Knowledge of past extinction events can inform us about potential paths for the future and perhaps help guide our actions, as our single powerful species threatens all others, and our own. We do not know how many animal, plant, insect, and microbe species exist today. Nor do we know the rate we are driving species to extinction. About two million species—half of them being insects, including butterflies—have been cataloged, but more are dis­covered every day. The order of magnitude for the total is perhaps ten million. Some biologists estimate that when all the microbes, fungi, and parasites are counted, there may be one hundred million species. Bird species are documented better than most. Everybody has heard of the dodo, the passenger pigeon, the ivory-billed woodpecker—all are gone—and the whooping crane, which, so far, we have just barely "saved." We are still losing one or two bird species per year. In total about 1 percent of bird species have disap­peared over the past several centuries. If the loss of birds is repre­sentative of other species, several thousand species are becoming extinct each year. The current extinction rate is at least one hundred times greater than the average natural rate. So the concern that humans may have initiated the sixth mass extinction is easy to understand. However, the outcome is still very much up in the air, and human-made cli­mate change is likely to be the determining factor. I will argue that if we continue on a business-as-usual path, with a global warming of several degrees Celsius, then we will drive a large fraction of species, conceivably all species, to extinction. On the other hand, just as in the case of ice sheet stability, if we bring atmospheric composition under control in the near future, it is still possible to keep human-caus ed extinctions to a moderate level.

#### ---Global warming amplifies all existing inequalities.

Hoerner & Robinson 2008

J. Andrew, Nia, A Climate of Change: African Americans, Global Warming, and a Just Climate Policy for the U.S., Environmental Justice and Climate Change Initiative, http://www.wholecommunities.org/pdf/Climate%20of%20Change\_Final\_6-29-08.pdf

Global warming ampliﬁes nearly all existing inequalities. Under global warming, injustices that are already unsustainable become catastrophic. Thus it is essential to recognize that all justice is climate justice and that the struggle for racial and economic justice is an unavoidable part of the ﬁght to halt global warming. Sound global warming policy is also economic and racial justice policy. Successfully adopting a sound global warming policy will do as much to strengthen the economies of low-income communities and communities of color as any other currently plausible stride toward economic justice.

### 1NC Case

#### We have learned the lessons of failed intervention- political and economic incentives means we will avoid starting protracted wars

Mandelbaum, 11 – John Hopkins University International Studies professor

[Michael, "CFR 90th Anniversary Series on Renewing America: American Power and Profligacy," CFR, 1-18-11, www.cfr.org/united-states/cfr-90th-anniversary-series-renewing-america-american-power-profligacy/p23828?cid=rss-fullfeed-cfr\_90th\_anniversary\_series\_on-011811&utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed:+cfr\_main+(CFR.org+-+Main+Site+Feed)

HAASS: Michael, I think I know the answer to this question, but let me ask you anyhow, which is, the last 10 years of American foreign policy has been dominated by two extremely expensive interventions, one in Iraq, one now in Afghanistan. Will this sort of pressure both accelerate the end, particularly of Afghanistan? But, more important, will this now -- is this the end of that phase of what we might call "discretionary American interventions?" Is this basically over? MANDELBAUM: Let's call them wars of choice. (Laughter.) HAASS: I was trying to be uncharacteristically self-effacing here. But clearly it didn't hold. Okay. MANDELBAUM: I think it is, Richard. And I think that this period really goes back two decades. I think the wars or the interventions in Somalia, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Haiti belong with the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, although they were undertaken by different administrations for different reasons, and had different costs. But all of them ended up in the protracted, unexpected, unwanted and expensive task of nation building. Nation building has never been popular. The country has never liked it. It likes it even less now. And I think **we're not going to do it again**. We're not going to do it because there won't be enough money. We're not going to do it because there will be other demands on the public purse. We won't do it because we'll be busy enough doing the things that I think ought to be done in foreign policy. And we won't do it because it will be clear to politicians that the range of legitimate choices that they have in foreign policy will have narrowed and will exclude interventions of that kind. So I believe and I say in the book that the last -- the first two post-Cold War decades can be seen as a single unit. And that unit has come to an end.

#### Moze is self-help nonsense-explicitly not about military issues

Moze, Ph.D in Personal Development, 7—Mary Beth, Ph.D. in Personal Development and Transformation [“Surrender: An Alchemical Act in Personal Transformation,” Journal of Conscious Evolution, http://www.cejournal.org/GRD/Surrender.pdf]

The role of surrender in the political and military literature is concerned with domination and control of perceived opponents. Its perspective is more about containment and limitations rather than expanding human capacity. Since my focus is directed toward human development and transformation, the conversations in that literature prove too unrelated to my investigation, and I negated them from my research.

#### Surrender can’t solve the aff---Anxiety short circuits solvency

Wolf 76 Surrender and Catch: Experience and Inquiry Today p. 325-6

After reviewing Maslow s, Enkson s, and ringarette s conceptions of health and expounding Joanna Field's experience in self-therapy,b Pennie concludes in 'Surrender: A Technique for Self-Therapy?\* that there may be some restrictions to the use of surrender as a technique in self-therapy. Granted the surrender experience can cause an expansion of awareness which can lead to perhaps the introduction of new meaning schemes for the individual. Granted by "suspending received notions" a reintegration can occur and evolve in the "catch." Granted the surrender experience can take place at a time when the self is ready to undertake a transformation, when the self is ready and "prepared." Yet, I still wonder whether surrender could possibly occur in a person who is not psychologically healthy to begin with. This leads me to think of the possible psychological prerequisites to surrender. One of the characteristics of surrender is the "risk of being hurt." "Since the surrenderer can and wants to know and change as a result of knowing, he is prepared to sustain injury .. ."c The question now arises whether he who is not healthy can bear the surrender experience. (...J The neurotic person does not want to know - knowing is fearful to him. He would not wish the surrender experience, he could probably [not] even allow it to overtake him because of his anxiety. Indeed, even if it did, it could destroy him. (...) The surrender situation is an uncontrolled situation - it could lead to the total breakdown of a neurotic individual - it could "overload the circuits." (...) Surrender also presents too much freedom - the neurotic could not possibly handle the total involvement that surrender brings. [...) "Surrender to" could be a technique for self-therapy for an individual who is not too disturbed, whose life has some meaning, whose self is somewhat integrated. Surrender, I would guess, can only be a technique for self-therapy for those who are already "healthy."

#### Terrorists goals are ideological; not political; there is no negotiation---only regulated violence in a utilitarian framework can solve

Whitman 7 (Jeffery, Prof of Philosophy, Religion, and Classical Studies Susquehanna University, “Just War Theory and the War on Terrorism A Utilitarian Perspective,” http://www.mesharpe.com/PIN/05Whitman.pdf)

Nonetheless, there was something different about the 9/11 attacks that is troubling, and that difference is the nihilistic nature of the attackers. Most, but not all, terrorist activity has a political or religious goal of some sort as its aim—the liberation of a minority group, the establishment of a new state, the removal of a perceived oppressor. Al-Qaeda professes a political goal, but its actions belie its claims. It claims to be fighting for the cause of Palestinian freedom and for oppressed Muslims everywhere, but it has appropriated the Islamic religion and the concept of jihad in order to recruit suicide bombers with the promise of martyrdom and entry into Paradise. In so doing, the political goal, if it ever existed, has become subservient to eschatological concerns. Political failure has become an irrelevant distraction that is trumped by the reward of eternal life. As Michael Ignatieff notes concerning al-Qaeda, their goals are less political than apocalyptic, securing immortality for themselves while calling down a mighty malediction on the Great Satan. Goals that are political can be engaged politically. Apocalyptic goals, on the other hand, are impossible to negotiate with. They can only be fought by force of arms. (2004, 125–126) This version of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, represented by such groups as Hamas, Hezbollah, and al-Qaeda, seems particularly intractable. These groups, especially insofar as they employ suicide-bomber tactics, have become death cults (Ignatieff 2004, 126–127). There can be no negotiated settlement, so the only solution seems to be a violent one aimed at the utter destruction of the terrorists. And yet, a purely violent and largely military response runs significant risks, both morally and pragmatically, for the counterterrorist forces. The risks are especially poignant for a liberal democracy like the United States, for the use of purely military means, particularly the brutal military means that may seem necessary to defeat terrorism, may run contrary to the very principles a liberal democracy represents (Ignatieff 2004, 133–136).6 Thus the terrorist threat represented by al-Qaeda–like groups presents a difficult and somewhat unique challenge for the United States. Nonetheless, I remain convinced that a utilitarian conceptualization of just war theory can help us to successfully navigate between the Scylla of losing the fight against terrorism and the Charybdis of abandoning the principles that define our liberal democracy.

#### Rises in terrorist recruitment have nothing to do with drones

Swift, Ph.D of National Security Studies at Georgetown, 7/1/13 (Christopher, Adjunct Professor of National Security Studies at Georgetown University and a Fellow at the University of Virginia Law School’s Center for National Security Law. An attorney and political scientist, his research examines the intersection between constitutional law, international law, and national security affairs, “The Drone Blowback Fallacy” <http://christopher-swift.com/publications/the-drone-blowback-fallacy>)

Last month, I traveled to Yemen to study how AQAP operates and whether the conventional understanding of the relationship between drones and recruitment is correct. While there, I conducted 40 interviews with tribal leaders, Islamist politicians, Salafist clerics, and other sources. These subjects came from 14 of Yemen’s 21 provinces, most from rural regions. Many faced insurgent infiltration in their own districts. Some of them were actively fighting AQAP. Two had recently visited terrorist strongholds in Jaar and Zinjibar as guests. I conducted each of these in-depth interviews using structured questions and a skilled interpreter. I have withheld my subjects’ names to protect their safety — a necessity occasioned by the fact that some of them had survived assassination attempts and that others had recently received death threats. These men had little in common with the Yemeni youth activists who capture headlines and inspire international acclaim. As a group, they were older, more conservative, and more skeptical of U.S. motives. They were less urban, less wealthy, and substantially less secular. But to my astonishment, none of the individuals I interviewed drew a causal relationship between U.S. drone strikes and al Qaeda recruiting. Indeed, of the 40 men in this cohort, only five believed that U.S. drone strikes were helping al Qaeda more than they were hurting it. Al Qaeda exploits U.S. errors, to be sure. As the Yemen scholar Gregory Johnsen correctly observes, the death of some 40 civilians in the December 2009 cruise missile strike on Majala infuriated ordinary Yemenis and gave AQAP an unexpected propaganda coup. But the fury produced by such tragedies is not systemic, not sustained, and, ultimately, not sufficient. As much as al Qaeda might play up civilian casualties and U.S. intervention in its recruiting videos, the Yemeni tribal leaders I spoke to reported that the factors driving young men into the insurgency are overwhelmingly economic. From al Hudaydah in the west to Hadhramaut in the east, AQAP is building complex webs of dependency within Yemen’s rural population. It gives idle teenagers cars, khat, and rifles — the symbols of Yemeni manhood. It pays salaries (up to $400 per month) that lift families out of poverty. It supports weak and marginalized sheikhs by digging wells, distributing patronage to tribesmen, and punishing local criminals. As the leader of one Yemeni tribal confederation told me, “Al Qaeda attracts those who can’t afford to turn away.” Religious figures echoed these words. Though critical of the U.S. drone campaign, none of the Islamists and Salafists I interviewed believed that drone strikes explain al Qaeda’s burgeoning numbers. “The driving issue is development,” an Islamist parliamentarian from Hadramout province said. “Some districts are so poor that joining al Qaeda represents the best of several bad options.” (Other options include criminality, migration, and even starvation.) A Salafi scholar engaged in hostage negotiations with AQAP agreed. “Those who fight do so because of the injustice in this country,” he explained. “A few in the north are driven by ideology, but in the south it is mostly about poverty and corruption.” Despite Yemenis’ antipathy toward drones, my conversations also revealed a surprising degree of pragmatism. Those living in active conflict zones drew clear distinctions between earlier U.S. operations, such as the Majala bombing, and more recent strikes on senior al Qaeda figures. “Things were very bad in 2009,” a tribal militia commander from Abyan province told me, “but now the drones are seen as helping us.” He explained that Yemenis could “accept [drones] as long as there are no more civilian casualties.” An Islamist member of the separatist al-Harak movement offered a similar assessment. “Ordinary people have become very practical about drones,” he said. “If the United States focuses on the leaders and civilians aren’t killed, then drone strikes will hurt al Qaeda more than they help them.” Some of the men I interviewed admitted that they had changed their minds about drone strikes. Separatists in Aden who openly derided AQAP as a proxy of Yemen’s recently deposed president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, privately acknowledged the utility of the U.S. drone campaign. “Saleh created this crisis in order to steal from America and stay in power,” a former official from the now-defunct People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen told me. “Now it is our crisis, and we need every tool to solve it.” Yemeni journalists, particularly those with firsthand exposure to AQAP, shared this view: “I opposed the drone campaign until I saw what al Qaeda was doing in Jaar and Zinjibar,” an independent reporter in Aden said. “Al Qaeda hates the drones, they’re absolutely terrified of the drones … and that is why we need them.”

#### Geography key to American Identity-Can’t solve-1AC evidence

Lifton, professor of psychiatry at Harvard, 3 [Robert Jay Lifton, Visiting Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, previously Distinguished Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at the Graduate School and Director of The Center on Violence and Human Survival at John Jay College of Criminal Justice at the City University of New York, 2003 (Superpower Syndrome: America’s Apocalyptic Confrontation With The World, Published by Thunder’s Mouth Press / Nation Books, ISBN 1560255129, p. 125-130)]

It is almost un-American to be vulnerable. As a people, we pride ourselves on being able to stand up to anything, solve all problems. We have long had a national self-image that involves an ability to call forth reservoirs or strength when we need it, and a sense of a protected existence peculiar to America in an otherwise precarious world. In recent times we managed, after all, to weather the most brutal century in human history relatively unscathed. THE BLESSED COUNTRY Our attitude stems partly from geography. We have always claimed a glorious aloneness thanks to what has been called the “Free security” of the two great oceans which separate us from dangerous upheavals in Europe and Asia. While George Washington was not the isolationist he is sometimes represented to be, he insisted on his celebrated Farewell Address of 1796, “’Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances, with any portion of the foreign world.” That image has been embraced, and often simplified or distorted, by politicians ever since. (He warned against permanent alliances, not alliances in general).

#### Greenwald list a bunch of alternative causalities----military budgets, nature of modern warfare

Greenwald1-1AC-13

The genius of America's endless war machine is that, learning from the unplesantness of the Vietnam war protests, it has rendered the costs of war largely invisible. That is accomplished by heaping all of the fighting burden on a tiny and mostly economically marginalized faction of the population, by using sterile, mechanized instruments to deliver the violence, and by suppressing any real discussion in establishment media circles of America's innocent victims and the worldwide anti-American rage that generates. Though rarely visible, the costs are nonetheless gargantuan. Just in financial terms, as Americans are told they must sacrifice Social Security and Medicare benefits and place their children in a crumbling educational system, the Pentagon remains the world's largest employer and continues to militarily outspend the rest of the world by a significant margin. The mythology of the Reagan presidency is that he induced the collapse of the Soviet Union by luring it into unsustainable military spending and wars: should there come a point when we think about applying that lesson to ourselves?

## \*\*\*2NC

### \*\*\*Reform AUMF CP

### AT: Perm Both

Surrender means

cease resistance to an enemy or opponent and submit to their authority.

Google Dictionary 13

#### Restrictions are prohibitions on action-the plan would obviously have to null and void the AUMF to prevent us from engaging in hostilities with terrorists.

Jean Schiedler-Brown 12, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown & Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe%27s.pdf

3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation.

Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as;

A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put. The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as; To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb.

In contrast, the terms "supervise" and "supervisor" are defined as; To have general oversight over, to superintend or to inspect. See Supervisor. A surveyor or overseer. . . In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct. The term "supervisor" means an individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment.

Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that the definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. Kincheloe essentially agreed to some supervision conditions, but he did not agree to restrict his license.

### Worse Justification-2NC

#### Dropping the AUMF increases prez powers-use article 2 as justification

Washington Post 5/31/13 (Editorial Board, “Obama’s counterterror contradiction” <http://bangordailynews.com/2013/05/31/opinion/other-voices/obamas-counterterror-contradiction/>)

There is a contradiction at the center of the counterterrorism policy announced by President Barack Obama in a speech last week. In describing a sharply reduced threat around the world, the president declared that “this war, like all wars, must end.” He promised “efforts to refine and ultimately repeal” the congressional declaration authorizing military action against al-Qaida and the Taliban and said he would reject any legislation “designed to expand this mandate further.” At the same time, Obama made clear that the war as it has been waged outside of Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan will continue, that it may be conducted in many parts of the world and that it will likely involve more drone attacks. He predicted “a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America.” So whether Obama declares the conflict with al-Qaida over and Congress repeals its authorization or they do not, the fight will continue. How much it will resemble that of the past four years — in which the CIA and military forces conducted hundreds of drone strikes in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen and supported armed operations by allies in several other countries — will depend more on the evolution of Islamist terrorism than on Washington. So why repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), the September 2001 legislation the president cited? Obama worries about “keeping America on a perpetual wartime footing”; he says that “unless we discipline our thinking and our actions, we may be drawn into more wars we don’t need to fight, or continue to grant presidents unbounded powers more suited for traditional armed conflicts between nation-states.” Those are legitimate concerns; we have argued for more transparency, congressional oversight and executive-branch accountability in the fight against al-Qaida, particularly when it comes to the use of drones. Yet there’s a danger that dropping the AUMF — as opposed to tailoring it to the new conditions Obama described — will result in less restraint on presidential power, not more. Obama didn’t delve into legal details in his speech. But the top legal advisers at the State and Defense departments during his first term have publicly argued that if the AUMF no longer applies, military attacks on terrorists can still be carried out under Article II of the Constitution, which grants the president power to defend the country against imminent attack. Most legal experts agree with that view. But as Harvard professor Jack Goldsmith argued in a recent blog post, for Obama or future presidents to conduct military operations on the scale of those now underway outside Afghanistan under Article II — as opposed to an act of Congress — “would be an unprecedented expansion of [presidential] authority.” Obama or a future president could, of course, seek specific congressional authorization to begin operations against a new terrorist threat. But another approach would be a proposal by Goldsmith and several other legal experts to revise the AUMF so as to grant the president authority to pursue al-Qaida spinoffs, subject to congressional review, while enacting legal constraints on the use of force outside conventional battlefields as well as reporting requirements to Congress. Obama has adopted some of those strictures in a presidential policy guidance and said all drone strikes were being reported to congressional committees. But these policies could be revoked with the stroke of a presidential pen. Obama pledged to “engage Congress about the existing AUMF to determine how we can continue to fight terrorism” without a permanent state of war. That’s the right discussion, but the result should be neither a legal vacuum nor the declaration of the end of a conflict that, by the president’s own account, is far from over.

#### New AUMF key to prevent worse interpretations of self-defense

**Barnes, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 2013**

(Beau, “The War On Terror Has Changed – Now The Rules Should, Too”, 5-16, <http://cognoscenti.wbur.org/2013/05/16/authorization-for-use-of-military-force-beau-barnes>, ldg)

In a laudable attempt to bring U.S. counterterrorism policy back within the rule of law, the Obama administration has invoked the AUMF as the basis for its global “targeted killing” operations, known by most simply as “drone strikes.” But, like its predecessor, this administration has also stretched the law to serve its purposes, and is currently contemplating even more implausible interpretations of the AUMF. The president and his legal team are pushing us closer to a place where every terrorist is a member of al-Qaida. How we justify counterterrorism operations is not just a question for the lawyers – it’s a policy choice with far-reaching domestic and international implications. Military might and covert operations alone can’t win the global struggle against al-Qaida and its ideological comrades-in-arms. We need credible arguments too, both to secure support from potential partners and undermine extremist justifications. As former Defense Department general counsel Jeh Johnson argued, “we must guard against aggressive interpretations of our authorities that will discredit our efforts, provoke controversy and invite challenge.” The administration has already read nearly all meaning out of the legal concepts of “imminence” and “hostilities” — another far-fetched legal interpretation might be the last straw for the administration’s legitimacy in the arena of counterterrorism. Alternatives to the AUMF exist, but they’re not good. Relying on inherent presidential power runs into considerable legal and political difficulties. Legally, this approach would risk intervention by a Supreme Court with a willingness to strike down excessive claims of executive power. Politically, it would be difficult to sustain for a president who ran for office largely on the promise of repudiating Bush-era legal excesses. A rationale based on the international law of self-defense is similarly unappealing. Although the Obama administration maintains that the AUMF “does not authorize military force against anyone the Executive labels a ‘terrorist,’” using this legal argument would lead to precisely that result, usurping Congress’s constitutionally provided role in national security policy. Since the United States plays an important role in setting norms of international conduct, our government should not claim legal rights that it is not prepared to see proliferate around the globe. UN officials recognize that the Obama administration’s “expansive and open-ended interpretation of the right to self-defense threatens to destroy the prohibition on the use of armed force.” CIA director John Brennan noted in 2012 that U.S. drone strikes “are establishing precedents that other nations may follow” – a concern that is already materializing. With international armed groups unlikely to disappear any time soon, one option rises above the rest: it’s time for a new AUMF. President Obama is understandably reluctant to legally entrench President Bush’s war on terror, but a properly drafted law could provide legitimacy to existing operations and constrain future presidents. Indeed, our concern shouldn’t be a new counterterrorism statute, but what happens in its absence.

### \*\*\*Terrorism DA

### AT: Islamophobia

#### Discursive othering doesn’t result in ‘uncontrollable violence’

Rodwell 5 (Jonathan Rodwell is a PhD student at Manchester Met. researching the U.S. Foreign Policy of the late 70's / rise of ‘neo-cons’ and Second Cold War, “Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson,” http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm)

To be specific if the U.S. and every other nation is continually reproducing identities through ‘othering’ it is a constant and universal phenomenon that fails to help us understand at all why one result of the othering turned out one way and differently at another time. For example, how could one explain how the process resulted in the 2003 invasion of Iraq but didn’t produce a similar invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 when that country (and by the logic of the Regan administrations discourse) the West was threatened by the ‘Evil Empire’. By the logical of discourse analysis in both cases these policies were the result of politicians being able to discipline and control the political agenda to produce the outcomes. So why were the outcomes not the same? To reiterate the point how do we explain that the language of the War on Terror actually managed to result in the eventual Afghan invasion in 2002? Surely it is impossible to explain how George W. Bush was able to convince his people (and incidentally the U.N and Nato) to support a war in Afghanistan without referring to a simple fact outside of the discourse; the fact that a known terrorist in Afghanistan actually admitted to the murder of thousands of people on the 11h of Sepetember 2001. The point is that if the discursive ‘othering’ of an ‘alien’ people or group is what really gave the U.S. the opportunity to persue the war in Afghanistan one must surly wonder why Afghanistan. Why not North Korea? Or Scotland? If the discourse is so powerfully useful in it’s own right why could it not have happened anywhere at any time and more often? Why could the British government not have been able to justify an armed invasion and regime change in Northern Ireland throughout the terrorist violence of the 1980’s? Surely they could have just employed the same discursive trickery as George W. Bush? Jackson is absolutely right when he points out that the actuall threat posed by Afghanistan or Iraq today may have been thoroughly misguided and conflated and that there must be more to explain why those wars were enacted at that time. Unfortunately that explanation cannot simply come from the result of inscripting identity and discourse. On top of this there is the clear problem that the consequences of the discursive othering are not necessarily what Jackson would seem to identify. This is a problem consistent through David Campbell’s original work on which Jackson’s approach is based[iii]. David Campbell argued for a linguistic process that ‘always results in an other being marginalized’ or has the potential for ‘demonisation’[iv]. At the same time Jackson, building upon this, maintains without qualification that the systematic and institutionalised abuse of Iraqi prisoners first exposed in April 2004 “is a direct consequence of the language used by senior administration officials: conceiving of terrorist suspects as ‘evil’, ‘inhuman’ and ‘faceless enemies of freedom creates an atmosphere where abuses become normalised and tolerated”[v]. The only problem is that the process of differentiation does not actually necessarily produce dislike or antagonism. In the 1940’s and 50’s even subjected to the language of the ‘Red Scare’ it’s obvious not all Americans came to see the Soviets as an ‘other’ of their nightmares. And in Iraq the abuses of Iraqi prisoners are isolated cases, it is not the case that the U.S. militarily summarily abuses prisoners as a result of language. Surely the massive protest against the war, even in the U.S. itself, is also a self evident example that the language of ‘evil’ and ‘inhumanity’ does not necessarily produce an outcome that marginalises or demonises an ‘other’. Indeed one of the points of discourse is that we are continually differentiating ourselves from all others around us without this necessarily leading us to hate fear or abuse anyone.[vi] Consequently, the clear fear of the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War, and the abuses at Abu Ghirab are unusual cases. To understand what is going on we must ask how far can the process of inscripting identity really go towards explaining them? As a result at best all discourse analysis provides us with is a set of universals and a heuristic model

#### Discourse analysis is tautology; if nothing is neutral all of their evidence has the same epistemological bias---linear causality is inevitable and has explanatory power

Rodwell 5 (Jonathan Rodwell is a PhD student at Manchester Met. researching the U.S. Foreign Policy of the late 70's / rise of ‘neo-cons’ and Second Cold War, “Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson,” http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm)

Next, discourse analysis as practiced exists within an enormous logical cul-de-sac. Born of the original premise that each discourse and explanation has it’s own realities, what results is a theoretical approach in which a critique is actually impossible because by post-structural logic a critique can only operate within it’s own discursive structure and on it’s own terms. If things only exist within specific languages and discourse you must share the basic premises of that discourse to be able to say anything about it. But what useful criticisms can you make if you share fundamental assumptions? Moreover remembering the much argued for normative purposes of Jackson’s case he talks about the effects of naturalizing language and without blushing criticises the dangerous anti-terror rhetoric of George W. Bush. The only problem is Jackson has attempted to illustrate that what is moral or immoral depends on the values and structures of each discourse. Therefore why should a reader believe Richard Jackson’s idea of right and wrong any more than George W. Bush’s? Fundamentally if he wishes to maintain that each discourse is specific to each intellectual framework Jackson cannot criticise at all. By his own epistemological rules if he is inside those discourses he shares their assumptions, outside they make no sense What actually occurs then is an aporia - a logical contraction where a works own stated epistemological premises rob it of the ability to contain any critical force. Such arguments are caught between the desire to maintain that all discursive practices construct their own truths, in which case critiques are not possible as they are merely one of countless possible discursive truths with no actually reason to take then seriously, or an appeal to material reality, but again the entire premises of post structural linguistics rejects the idea of a material reality.[vii] In starting from a premise that it is not possible to neutrally describe the real world, the result is that without that real world, discourse analysis actually has nothing to say. The issue of the material real world, or ‘evidence’ is actually the issue at the heart of the weakness of post-structural discourse analysis, though it does hold the potential to at least rescue some of it’s usefulness. The problem is simple, in that the only way Jackson or any post-structuralist can operationalise their argument is with an appeal to material evidence. But by the logic of discourse analysis there is no such thing as neutral ‘evidence’. To square this circle many post-struturalist writers do seem to hint at complexity and what post-structural culturalists might call ‘intertextuality’, arguing for ‘favouring a complexity of interactions’ rather than ‘linear causality’[viii]. The implication is that language is just one of an endless web of factors and surely this prompts one to pursue an understanding of these links. However, to do so would dangerously undermine the entire post-structural project as again, if there are discoverable links between factors, then there are material facts that are identifiable regardless of language. Consequently, rather than seeking to understand the links between factors what seems to happen is hands are thrown up in despair as the search for complexity is dropped as quickly as it is picked up. The result is one-dimensional arguments that again can say little. This is evident in Jackson’s approach as he details how words have histories and moreover are part of a dialectic process in which ‘they not only shape social structures but are also shaped by them’.[ix] However we do not then see any discussion of whether, therefore, it is not discourse that is the powerful tool but the effect of the history and the social structure itself. Throughout Jackson’s argument it is a top down process in which discourse disciplines society to follow the desire of the dominant, but here is an instance of a dialectic process where society may actually be the originating force, allowing the discourse in turn to actually to be more powerful. However we simply see no exploration of this potential dialectic process, merely the suggestion it exists.

#### Their argument essentializes terror scholarship – it’s not a monolithic entity – defer to specific research

Michael J. Boyle '8, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, April 2008, “A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 51-64

Some CTS advocates have positioned the CTS project against something usually called ‘terrorism studies’, ‘Orthodox terrorism studies’ or, alternatively, ‘terrorology’. Whatever these bodies of literature are (or at least are imagined by those who have created them as such), they are recent intellectual constructions, the product of an over-generalization that has emerged from the identification of (1) the limitations associated with terrorism research to date, coupled with (2) a less than complete understanding of the nature of research on terrorism. **A cursory review of the terrorism literature reveals that attempts to generalize about something called Orthodox Terrorism Studies are deeply problematic. Among terrorism scholars, there are wide disagreements about, among others, the definition of terrorism, the causes of terrorism, the role and value of the concept of ‘radicalization’ and ‘extremism’, the role of state terror, the role that foreign policy plays in motivating or facilitating terrorism, the ethics of terrorism, and the proper way to conduct ‘counter-terrorism’**. A cursory examination of the contents of the two most well-known terrorism journals Terrorism and Political Violence and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism quickly reveals this. **These differences, and the concomitant disagreements that result in the literature, cut across disciplines** – principally political science and psychology, but also others, such as anthropology, sociology, theology, and philosophy – **and even within disciplines wide disagreements about methods** (for example, discourse analysis, rational choice, among others) **persist. To suggest that they can be lumped together as something called ‘terrorology’ or ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’ belies a narrow reading of the literature. This is, in short, a ‘straw man’ which helps position CTS in the field but is not based on a well-grounded critique of the current research on terrorism.**

#### Terrorism studies are epistemologically and methodologically valid---our authors are self-reflexive

Michael J. Boyle '8, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, April 2008, “A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 51-64

Jackson (2007c) calls for the development of an explicitly CTS on the basis of what he argues preceded it, dubbed ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’. The latter, he suggests, is characterized by: (1) its poor methods and theories, (2) its state centricity, (3) its problemsolving orientation, and (4) its institutional and intellectual links to state security projects. Jackson argues that the major defining characteristic of CTS, on the other hand, should be ‘a skeptical attitude towards accepted terrorism “knowledge”’. **An implicit presumption from this is that terrorism scholars have laboured for all of these years without being aware that their area of study has an implicit bias, as well as definitional and methodological** **problems**. In fact**, terrorism scholars are not only well aware of these problems, but also have provided their own** searching **critiques** of the field at various points during the last few decades (e.g. Silke 1996, Crenshaw 1998, Gordon 1999, Horgan 2005, esp. ch. 2, ‘Understanding Terrorism’). **Some of those scholars most associated with the critique of empiricism** implied in ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’ **have also engaged in deeply critical examinations of the nature of sources, methods, and data in the study of terrorism**. For example, Jackson (2007a) regularly cites the handbook produced by **Schmid and Jongman** (1988) to support his claims that theoretical progress has been limited. But this fact was well recognized by the authors; indeed, in the introduction of the second edition they **point out** that they have not revised their chapter on theories of terrorism from the first edition, because the **failure to address** persistent conceptual and **data problems** has undermined progress in the field. The point of their handbook was to sharpen and make more comprehensive the result of research on terrorism, not to glide over its methodological and definitional failings (Schmid and Jongman 1988, p. xiv). Similarly, **Silke’s** (2004) **volume on the state of the field of terrorism research performed a similar function**, highlighting the shortcomings of the field, in particular the lack of rigorous primary data collection. **A non-reflective community of scholars does not produce such scathing indictments of its own work.**

#### They tear down terrorism studies to stand in rubble---their methodology essentializes violence collapsing the utility of research; our methodology is empirical

Nexon 12 (Daniel, is an associate professor in the School of Foreign Service and the Department of Government at Georgetown University“A Modest Defense of Terrorism Studies,” http://www.whiteoliphaunt.com/duckofminerva/2012/08/a-modest-defense-of-terrorism-studies.html)

Second, it would not be helpful for scholars to combine non-state and state acts of violence into one overarching concept. Concepts need both a well-defined positive pole and negative pole. It must be clear what the concept covers, and what it does not cover. Expanding a concept too much results in conceptual stretching, which undermines its utility. Think about it empirically. What would we accomplish by undertaking studies of “terror,” state and non-state? Datasets combining every type of violence would lead to insignificant or–worse–significant but nonsensical results. Case studies that compared state and non-state terror would not tell us much besides “oh, both are pretty bad.” Narrow definitions may be annoying and normatively problematic, but they are the most useful in empirical studies. Finally, even if terrorism does not threaten to destroy the American way of life, we should still study it. Yes, some terrorism pundits have an agenda. And yes, the threat from terrorism was used to justify two wars. But non-state groups that use violence for ideological purposes exist, and have killed people. It helps to know why, and what we can do about it. Maybe terrorism isn’t the best term. Personally, I’d be thrilled if we all adopted Tilly’s framework for political violence. But given the dominance of the term in popular and scholarly debates, those of us who would like to see a different approach to “terrorism” should avoid demonizing the counter-terrorism community and pulling down the walls of terrorism studies only to stand in the rubble.

### AT: Justifies Endless War

#### CP solve---no endless war, the review process assures it comes to an end, that’s Brooks

#### Rejecting war collapses deterrence and risks nuclear war—ideological conflict assures escalation

Dipert 6 (Randall, PhD, Professor of Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, “Preventive War and the Epistemological Dimension of the Morality of War,” https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1291-dipert-preventive-war)

One might think that this principle would give little guidance in recommending anticipatory wars. However, let us suppose that John Rawls, following Raymond Aron and others, is correct in claiming that democratic states (‘liberal constitutional democracies’) have very few except legitimate reasons to go to war, and consequently rarely do go to war for ‘bad’ reasons (Rawls 1999: 47).42 Some wars might still occur because of epistemic mistakes or from (legitimate) mutual fear and distrust trust\*/something Rawls seems not to consider. Let us further suppose that this general level of warfare in a region or in the world gradually decreases in those places where there exist nothing but constitutional democracies. Let us further suppose that democracy can be imposed, or the conditions for democracy can be created, by the correct application of military force. Then there are circumstances in which, if the conditions for the permissibility of preventive of war are met, then preventive war is further recommended by this second principle. There is an interesting question here, beyond philosophical considerations, about whether a nation should formulate and announce policies of exactly what conditions will, and what conditions will not, trigger preventive war. 43 But there is another and telling side of this coin: what if we should have and announce a policy of never engaging in any preemptive or preventive war? Here I think we are encouraging a hostile enemy to prepare an offensive, including weapons development, right up an actual attack. If there do exist, or can possibly exist, truly devastating weapons, this is to invite their development and one’s own annihilation. Even a small nuclear power with ballistic missiles (perhaps positioning missiles on ocean freighters on the high seas) would be free to inflict devastating attacks. While large, stable countries such as China and the former USSR, have historically been deterred by the policy of massive nuclear retaliation, it is unlikely that all nuclear nations with ballistic missiles (including terrorist organizations), will remain deterrable. I believe that such a policy of banning or foreswearing preventive war would almost certainly result in more, rather than fewer, wars and deaths, because it would embolden more state-like entities to believe that they could succeed in an unjust war, especially in ideological wars whose ‘success’ consists simply in inflicting harm on its enemy at all costs.44 To announce a policy of rejecting any preemptive or preventive war is thus almost certainly mistaken and violates my second principle insofar as it increases possible threats. The rare and careful use of restricted preemptive and preventive war, under unspecified conditions, in the world we are likely to have for centuries\*/without, for example, militarily dominant international organizations willing to punish with force the illegitimate use of force\*/is actually likely to make the world more safe. This is not a conclusion that I am especially happy with.45

### Drones Good – Terrorism

#### Targeted killing key to counterterrorism-disrupts leadership and makes carrying out attacks impossible-evidence is comparative

**Anderson, American university international law professor, 2013**

(Kenneth, “The Case for Drones”, Commentary, 135.6, June, ebsco, ldg)

Targeted killing of high-value terrorist targets, by contrast, is the end result of a long, independent intelligence process. What the drone adds to that intelligence might be considerable, through its surveillance capabilities -- but much of the drone's contribution will be tactical, providing intelligence that assists in the planning and execution of the strike itself, in order to pick the moment when there might be the fewest civilian casualties. Nonetheless, in conjunction with high-quality intelligence, drone warfare offers an unparalleled means to strike directly at terrorist organizations without needing a conventional or counterinsurgency approach to reach terrorist groups in their safe havens. It offers an offensive capability, rather than simply defensive measures, such as homeland security alone. Drone warfare offers a raiding strategy directly against the terrorists and their leadership. If one believes, as many of the critics of drone warfare do, that the proper strategies of counterterrorism are essentially defensive -- including those that eschew the paradigm of armed conflict in favor of law enforcement and criminal law -- then the strategic virtue of an offensive capability against the terrorists themselves will seem small. But that has not been American policy since 9/11, not under the Bush administration, not under the Obama administration -- and not by the Congress of the United States, which has authorized hundreds of billions of dollars to fight the war on terror aggressively. The United States has used many offensive methods in the past dozen years: Regime change of states offering safe havens, counter-insurgency war, special operations, military and intelligence assistance to regimes battling our common enemies are examples of the methods that are just of military nature. Drone warfare today is integrated with a much larger strategic counterterrorism target -- one in which, as in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, radical Islamist groups seize governance of whole populations and territories and provide not only safe haven, but also an honored central role to transnational terrorist groups. This is what current conflicts in Yemen and Mali threaten, in counterterrorism terms, and why the United States, along with France and even the UN, has moved to intervene militarily. Drone warfare is just one element of overall strategy, but it has a clear utility in disrupting terrorist leadership. It makes the planning and execution of complex plots difficult if only because it is hard to plan for years down the road if you have some reason to think you will be struck down by a drone but have no idea when. The unpredictability and terrifying anticipation of sudden attack, which terrorists have acknowledged in communications, have a significant impact on planning and organizational effectiveness.

### HEg

#### Decline causes nuclear war-only the US has the motive and capability to provide public goods that reduce incentive for war.

**Kagan, Brookings senior fellow, 2012**

(Robert, “Why the World Need America”, 2-11, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203646004577213262856669448.html>, ldg)

With the outbreak of World War I, the age of settled peace and advancing liberalism—of European civilization approaching its pinnacle—collapsed into an age of hyper-nationalism, despotism and economic calamity. The once-promising spread of democracy and liberalism halted and then reversed course, leaving a handful of outnumbered and besieged democracies living nervously in the shadow of fascist and totalitarian neighbors. The collapse of the British and European orders in the 20th century did not produce a new dark age—though if Nazi Germany and imperial Japan had prevailed, it might have—but the horrific conflict that it produced was, in its own way, just as devastating. Would the end of the present American-dominated order have less dire consequences? A surprising number of American intellectuals, politicians and policy makers greet the prospect with equanimity. There is a general sense that the end of the era of American pre-eminence, if and when it comes, need not mean the end of the present international order, with its widespread freedom, unprecedented global prosperity (even amid the current economic crisis) and absence of war among the great powers. American power may diminish, the political scientist G. John Ikenberry argues, but "the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive." The commentator Fareed Zakaria believes that even as the balance shifts against the U.S., rising powers like China "will continue to live within the framework of the current international system." And there are elements across the political spectrum—Republicans who call for retrenchment, Democrats who put their faith in international law and institutions—who don't imagine that a "post-American world" would look very different from the American world. If all of this sounds too good to be true, it is. The present world order was largely shaped by American power and reflects American interests and preferences. If the balance of power shifts in the direction of other nations, the world order will change to suit their interests and preferences. Nor can we assume that all the great powers in a post-American world would agree on the benefits of preserving the present order, or have the capacity to preserve it, even if they wanted to. Take the issue of democracy. For several decades, the balance of power in the world has favored democratic governments. In a genuinely post-American world, the balance would shift toward the great-power autocracies. Both Beijing and Moscow already protect dictators like Syria's Bashar al-Assad. If they gain greater relative influence in the future, we will see fewer democratic transitions and more autocrats hanging on to power. The balance in a new, multipolar world might be more favorable to democracy if some of the rising democracies—Brazil, India, Turkey, South Africa—picked up the slack from a declining U.S. Yet not all of them have the desire or the capacity to do it. What about the economic order of free markets and free trade? People assume that China and other rising powers that have benefited so much from the present system would have a stake in preserving it. They wouldn't kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. Unfortunately, they might not be able to help themselves. The creation and survival of a liberal economic order has depended, historically, on great powers that are both willing and able to support open trade and free markets, often with naval power. If a declining America is unable to maintain its long-standing hegemony on the high seas, would other nations take on the burdens and the expense of sustaining navies to fill in the gaps? Even if they did, would this produce an open global commons—or rising tension? China and India are building bigger navies, but the result so far has been greater competition, not greater security. As Mohan Malik has noted in this newspaper, their "maritime rivalry could spill into the open in a decade or two," when India deploys an aircraft carrier in the Pacific Ocean and China deploys one in the Indian Ocean. The move from American-dominated oceans to collective policing by several great powers could be a recipe for competition and conflict rather than for a liberal economic order. And do the Chinese really value an open economic system? The Chinese economy soon may become the largest in the world, but it will be far from the richest. Its size is a product of the country's enormous population, but in per capita terms, China remains relatively poor. The U.S., Germany and Japan have a per capita GDP of over $40,000. China's is a little over $4,000, putting it at the same level as Angola, Algeria and Belize. Even if optimistic forecasts are correct, China's per capita GDP by 2030 would still only be half that of the U.S., putting it roughly where Slovenia and Greece are today. Although the Chinese have been beneficiaries of an open international economic order, they could end up undermining it simply because, as an autocratic society, their priority is to preserve the state's control of wealth and the power that it brings. They might kill the goose that lays the golden eggs because they can't figure out how to keep both it and themselves alive. Finally, what about the long peace that has held among the great powers for the better part of six decades? Would it survive in a post-American world? Most commentators who welcome this scenario imagine that American predominance would be replaced by some kind of multipolar harmony. But multipolar systems have historically been neither particularly stable nor particularly peaceful. Rough parity among powerful nations is a source of uncertainty that leads to **miscalculation**. Conflicts erupt as a result of fluctuations in the delicate power equation. War among the great powers was a common, if not constant, occurrence in the long periods of multipolarity from the 16th to the 18th centuries, culminating in the series of enormously destructive Europe-wide wars that followed the French Revolution and ended with Napoleon's defeat in 1815. The 19th century was notable for two stretches of great-power peace of roughly four decades each, punctuated by major conflicts. The Crimean War (1853-1856) was a mini-world war involving well over a million Russian, French, British and Turkish troops, as well as forces from nine other nations; it produced almost a half-million dead combatants and many more wounded. In the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), the two nations together fielded close to two million troops, of whom nearly a half-million were killed or wounded. The peace that followed these conflicts was characterized by increasing tension and competition, numerous war scares and massive increases in armaments on both land and sea. Its climax was World War I, the most destructive and deadly conflict that mankind had known up to that point. As the political scientist Robert W. Tucker has observed, "Such stability and moderation as the balance brought rested ultimately on the threat or use of force. War remained the essential means for maintaining the balance of power." There is little reason to believe that a return to multipolarity in the 21st century would bring greater peace and stability than it has in the past. The era of American predominance has shown that **there is no better recipe for** great-power **peace than certainty about who holds the upper hand**. President Bill Clinton left office believing that the key task for America was to "create the world we would like to live in when we are no longer the world's only superpower," to prepare for "a time when we would have to share the stage." It is an eminently sensible-sounding proposal. But can it be done? For particularly in matters of security, the rules and institutions of international order rarely survive the decline of the nations that erected them. They are like scaffolding around a building: They don't hold the building up; the building holds them up. Many foreign-policy experts see the present international order as the inevitable result of human progress, a combination of advancing science and technology, an increasingly global economy, strengthening international institutions, evolving "norms" of international behavior and the gradual but inevitable triumph of liberal democracy over other forms of government—forces of change that transcend the actions of men and nations. Americans certainly like to believe that our preferred order survives because it is right and just—not only for us but for everyone. We assume that the triumph of democracy is the triumph of a better idea, and the victory of market capitalism is the victory of a better system, and that both are irreversible. That is why Francis Fukuyama's thesis about "the end of history" was so attractive at the end of the Cold War and retains its appeal even now, after it has been discredited by events. The idea of inevitable evolution means that there is no requirement to impose a decent order. It will merely happen. But international order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It is the domination of one vision over others—in America's case, the domination of free-market and democratic principles, together with an international system that supports them. The present order will last only as long as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and capacity to defend it. There was nothing inevitable about the world that was created after World War II. No divine providence or unfolding Hegelian dialectic required the triumph of democracy and capitalism, and there is no guarantee that their success will outlast the powerful nations that have fought for them. Democratic progress and liberal economics have been and can be reversed and undone. The ancient democracies of Greece and the republics of Rome and Venice all fell to more powerful forces or through their own failings. The evolving liberal economic order of Europe collapsed in the 1920s and 1930s. The better idea doesn't have to win just because it is a better idea. It requires great powers to champion it. If and when American power declines, the institutions and norms that American power has supported will decline, too. Or more likely, if history is a guide, they may collapse altogether as we make a transition to another kind of world order, or to disorder. We may discover then that the U.S. was essential to keeping the present world order together and that the alternative to American power was not peace and harmony but **chaos and catastrophe**—which is what the world looked like right before the American order came into being.

### AT: Surrender Good

#### Rejecting war collapses deterrence and risks nuclear war—ideological conflict assures escalation

Dipert 6 (Randall, PhD, Professor of Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, “Preventive War and the Epistemological Dimension of the Morality of War,” https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1291-dipert-preventive-war)

One might think that this principle would give little guidance in recommending anticipatory wars. However, let us suppose that John Rawls, following Raymond Aron and others, is correct in claiming that democratic states (‘liberal constitutional democracies’) have very few except legitimate reasons to go to war, and consequently rarely do go to war for ‘bad’ reasons (Rawls 1999: 47).42 Some wars might still occur because of epistemic mistakes or from (legitimate) mutual fear and distrust trust\*/something Rawls seems not to consider. Let us further suppose that this general level of warfare in a region or in the world gradually decreases in those places where there exist nothing but constitutional democracies. Let us further suppose that democracy can be imposed, or the conditions for democracy can be created, by the correct application of military force. Then there are circumstances in which, if the conditions for the permissibility of preventive of war are met, then preventive war is further recommended by this second principle. There is an interesting question here, beyond philosophical considerations, about whether a nation should formulate and announce policies of exactly what conditions will, and what conditions will not, trigger preventive war. 43 But there is another and telling side of this coin: what if we should have and announce a policy of never engaging in any preemptive or preventive war? Here I think we are encouraging a hostile enemy to prepare an offensive, including weapons development, right up an actual attack. If there do exist, or can possibly exist, truly devastating weapons, this is to invite their development and one’s own annihilation. Even a small nuclear power with ballistic missiles (perhaps positioning missiles on ocean freighters on the high seas) would be free to inflict devastating attacks. While large, stable countries such as China and the former USSR, have historically been deterred by the policy of massive nuclear retaliation, it is unlikely that all nuclear nations with ballistic missiles (including terrorist organizations), will remain deterrable. I believe that such a policy of banning or foreswearing preventive war would almost certainly result in more, rather than fewer, wars and deaths, because it would embolden more state-like entities to believe that they could succeed in an unjust war, especially in ideological wars whose ‘success’ consists simply in inflicting harm on its enemy at all costs.44 To announce a policy of rejecting any preemptive or preventive war is thus almost certainly mistaken and violates my second principle insofar as it increases possible threats. The rare and careful use of restricted preemptive and preventive war, under unspecified conditions, in the world we are likely to have for centuries\*/without, for example, militarily dominant international organizations willing to punish with force the illegitimate use of force\*/is actually likely to make the world more safe. This is not a conclusion that I am especially happy with.45

### \*\*\*Case

### 2NC Surrender Fails

#### Not mil

#### Anxiety, always afraid of losing and looking bad so we freak out at the prospect of losing, proven by the CX, Patton’s quote is all about winning in games, why he references marbles, his visceral reaction to distuish between just this type of winning victory and validitation cracks their ethics because it means there is always a time when it is just to be a competitive narrisistic jerk, in their case its in games, but for some the war on terror is a game, its just a violent one, proves the inescapability of the feeling of being vulnerable.

#### Their psychology arguments are crap straight out of a self help book---they can’t spur change with their positive thought experiment

Taylor 11 (Jim Taylor, Ph.D., is an adjunct professor at the University of San Francisco, “Personal Growth: Is the Self-help Industry a Fraud?,” http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-power-prime/201104/personal-growth-is-the-self-help-industry-fraud)

Change, however, is not easy. In fact, it is downright difficult. That's why most people don't change and why the self-help industry is so robust; no one has offered a way for those millions upon millions of self-help consumers to make the changes they want. If someone had actually found the answer to the question, "How do people change?," there would be no self-help industry, just one very rich person. People are willing to plunk down $23.95 for a book or $15.95 for a DVD that promises that its method is really-no, I mean really-the one that will help them change (what's a few bucks for the possibility-whatever the improbability-of finding that pot of gold at the end of the "I can change my life" rainbow?). Of course, when that book, CD, or DVD doesn't produce the desired change, another self-help product comes along that promises to do the trick. And as long as the price is right, people will continue to line the pockets of the self-help industry in perpetuity. To do otherwise would be to admit defeat and be labeled a loser in our aspirational, "I can have everything I want without any effort" culture. Such an admission would mean a life-long sentence of not being successful, happy, rich, slim, or loved. And that is just plain unacceptable There are many obstacles that stand in the way of change, ranging from emotional baggage and ingrained habits to an environment that reinforces the status quo and is hostile to change. And, contrary to the assertions of just about every self-help book that has ever been written, change takes incredible commitment, time, energy, and effort. Someone might be able to show you the way, but you have to make the journey yourself. So if you're looking for a quick and easy path to change from any self-help book, CD, or DVD that promises you instant and effortless change, put it back on the shelf or return it to amazon. I can assure you that you're wasting your money and time.

#### The public and party structures are committed to an aggressive foreign policy-it’s what the people want-and any outbreak of terrorism will turn us more neocon

**McDonough, Dalhousie Centre for Foreign Policy Studies fellow, 2009**

(David, “Beyond Primacy: Hegemony and ‘Security Addiction’ in U.S. Grand Strategy”, Winter, Orbis, ScienceDirect, ldg)

The reason that the current debate is currently mired in second-order issues of multilateral versus unilateral legitimacy can be attributed to the post 9/11 security environment. A grand strategy is, after all, ‘‘a state’s theory about how it can best cause security for itself.’’ 35 It would be prudent to examine why the neoconservative ‘‘theory’’ proved to be so attractive to American decision-makers after the 9/11 attacks, and why the Democrats have begun to rely on an equally primacist ‘‘theory’’ of their own. As Charles Kupchan has demonstrated, a sense of vulnerability is often directly associated with dramatic shifts in a state’s grand strategy. Kupchan is, of course, largely concerned with vulnerability to changes in the global distribution of power. 36 Even so, the 9/11 terrorist attacks have dramatically increased the U.S. sense of strategic vulnerability to both global terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and even to more traditional threats that are seen, as Donald Rumsfeld said, ‘‘in a dramatic new light–through the prism of our experience on 9/11.’’ 37 Perhaps more than any previous terrorist action, these attacks demonstrated the potential inﬂuence of non-state terrorist groups like Al Qaeda. U.S. strategic primacy makes conventional responses unattractive and ultimately futile to potential adversaries. The country’s societal vulnerability to terrorist attacks will likewise lead to extremely costly defensive reactions against otherwise limited attacks. For both the United States and its asymmetrical adversaries, the advantage clearly favors the offense over the defense. With the innumerable list of potential targets, ‘‘preemptive and preventive attacks will accomplish more against. . .[terrorists or their support structures], dollar for dollar, than the investment in passive defenses.’’ 38 As former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith has argued, a primary reliance on defense requires instrusive security measures that would inevitably endanger American civil liberties and curtail its free and open society. 39 Strategic preponderance ensures that the United States will continue to face adversaries eager to implement asymmetrical tactics, even as it offers the very resources necessary to implement both offensive and less effective defensive measures. Unfortunately, terrorist groups with strategic reach (i.e., capable of inﬂuencing the actions of states) will likely increase in the coming years due to a combination of factors, including the ‘‘democractization of technology,’’ the ‘‘privatization of war’’ and the ‘‘miniaturization of weaponry.’’ As more groups are imbued with sophisticated technological capabilities and are able to employ increasingly lethal weapons, the United States will be forced to rely even further on its unprecedented global military capabilities to eliminate this threat. The global war on terror, even with tactical successes against al Qaeda, will likely result in an inconclusive ending marked by the fragmentation and proliferation of terrorist spoiler groups. The ‘‘Israelization’’ of the United States, in which ‘‘security trumps everything,’’ will be no temporary phenomenon. 40 Realism provides an insufﬁcient means for understanding the current post-9/11 strategic threat environment and underestimates the potential impact of the terrorist threat on the American sense of vulnerability. Globalized terrorism must be confronted by proactive measures to reduce the domestic vulnerability to attack and to eliminate these organizations in their external sanctuaries. Even then, these measures will never be able to ensure ‘‘perfect security.’’ As a result, signiﬁcant public pressure for expanded security measures will arise after any attack. The United States will be consumed with what Frank Harvey has termed security addiction: ‘‘As expectations for acceptable levels of pain decrease, billions of dollars will continue to be spent by both parties in a never-ending competition to convince the American public that their party’s programs are different and more likely to succeed.’’ 41 This addiction has an important impact on the dramatically rising levels of homeland security spending. Indeed, while this increased spending is an inevitable and prudent reaction to the terrorist threat, it also creates high public expectations that will only amplify outrage in a security failure. 42 Relatedly, American strategic preponderance plays an important role in facilitating a vigorous international response to globalized terrorism, including the use of coercive military options and interventions. A primacist strategy has the dual attraction of both maximizing U.S. strategic dominance and convincing the public of a party’s national security credentials. Indeed, the Republicans had developed a strong advantage in electoral politics by its adherence to a strong military and aggressive strategy, and the Democrats in turn ‘‘learned the lesson of its vulnerability on the issue and [...] explicitly declared its devotion to national security and support for the military.’’ 43 The 9/11 attacks may not have altered the distribution of power amongst major states, but it has directly created a domestic political situation marked by an addiction to expansive security measures that are needed to satisfy increasingly high public expectations. In such a climate, it is easy to see why the neo-conservatives were so successful in selling their strategic vision. The fact that the United States has effectively settled on a grand strategy of primacy in the post-9/11 period should come as no surprise. **It is simply inconceivable that a political party could successfully advocate a grand strategy that does not embrace military preeminence and interventionism**, two factors that are seen to provide a deﬁnite advantage in the pursuit of a ‘‘global war on terror.’’ Political parties may disagree on the necessary tactics to eliminate the terrorist threat. But with increased vulnerability and security addiction, the United States will continue to embrace strategies of primacy– rather than going ‘‘beyond primacy’’–for much of the Long War.

#### Congress is not deliberative--Legal restrictions are temporary and unenforceable in the long term

**Posner and Vermeule, 10** - \*professor of law at the University of Chicago AND \*\*professor of law at Harvard (Eric and Adrian, The Executive Unbound, p. 41-45)

Liberal legalists, following Madison, describe Congress as the deliberative institution par excellence. On this view, Congress is a summation of local majorities, bringing local information and diverse perspectives to national issues. The bicameral structure of Congress aids deliberation; the House shifts rapidly in response to changing conditions and national moods, while the Senate provides a long-term perspective, and cools off overheated or panicky legislation. The Madisonian emphasis on the cooling-off function of the Senate functions as a check on executive claims that an emergency is at hand. The application of the Madisonian view to crises or emergencies is the default position among legal academics. On this view, even in crisis situations the executive may act only on the basis of clear congressional authorization that follows public deliberation, and the executive’s actions must presumptively be subject to judicial review. A proviso to the Madisonian view is that if immediate action is literally necessary, the executive may act, but only until Congress can convene to deliberate; if the executive’s interim actions were illegal, it must seek ratification from Congress and the public after the fact.53 In the Schmittian view, by contrast, the Madisonian vision of Congress seems hopelessly optimistic. Even in normal times, Schmitt believed, the deliberative aspirations of classical parliamentary democracy have become a transparent sham under modern conditions of party discipline, interest-group conflict, and a rapidly changing economic and technical environment. Rather than deliberate, legislators bargain, largely along partisan lines. Discussion on the legislative floor, if it even occurs, is carefully orchestrated posturing for public consumption, while the real work goes on behind closed doors, in party caucuses. How does this picture relate to Schmitt’s point that legislatures invariably “come too late” to a crisis? Crises expose legislative debility to view, but do not create it. Indeed, legislative failure during crises is in part a consequence of legislative failure during the normal times that precede crises. The basic dilemma for legislators, is that before a crisis, they lack the motivation and information to provide for it in advance, while after the crisis has begun, they lack the capacity to manage it themselves. We will describe each horn of the dilemma in detail. BEFORE THE CRISIS In the precrisis state, legislatures mired in partisan conflict about ordinary politics lack the motivation to address long-term problems. Legislators at this point act from behind a veil of uncertainty about the future, and may thus prove relatively impartial; at least high uncertainty obscures the distributive effects of legislation for the future, and thus reduces partisan opposition. However, by virtue of these very facts, there is no strong partisan support for legislation, and no bloc of legislators has powerful incentives to push legislation onto the crowded agenda. The very impartiality that makes ex ante legislation relatively attractive, from a Madisonian perspective, also reduces the motivation to enact it. This point is related to, but distinct from, Schmitt’s more famous claim about the “norm” and the “exception.” In a modern rendition, that claim holds that ex ante legal rules cannot regulate crises in advance, because unanticipated events will invariably arise. Legislatures therefore either decline to regulate in advance or enact emergency statutes with vague standards that defy judicial enforcement ex post. Here, however, a different point is at issue: even if ex ante legal rules could perfectly anticipate all future events, legislatures will often lack the incentive to adopt them in advance. Occasionally, when a high-water mark of public outrage against the executive is reached, legislatures do adopt framework statutes that attempt to regulate executive behavior ex ante; several statutes of this kind were adopted after Watergate. The problem is that new presidents arrive, the political coalitions that produced the framework statute come apart as new issues emerge, and public outrage against executive abuses cools. Congress soon relapses into passivity and cannot sustain the will to enforce, ex post, the rules set out in the framework statutes. As we will discuss more fully in chapter 3, the post-Watergate framework statutes have thus, for the most part, proven to impose little constraint on executive action in crisis, in large part because Congress lacks the motivation to enforce them. DURING THE CRISIS The other horn of the dilemma arises after the crisis has begun to unfold. Because of their numerous memberships, elaborate procedures, and internal structures, such as bicameralism and the committee system, and internal problems of collective action, legislatures can rarely act swiftly and decisively as events unfold. The very complexity and diversity that make legislatures the best deliberators, from a Madisonian perspective, also raise the opportunity costs of deliberation during crises and disable legislatures from decisively managing rapidly changing conditions. After 9/11, everyone realized that another attack might be imminent; only an immediate, massive response could forestall it. In September 2008, the financial markets needed immediate reassurance: only credible announcements from government agencies that they would provide massive liquidity could supply such reassurance. Indeed, though commentators unanimously urged Congress to take its time, within weeks the Bush administration was being criticized for not acting quickly enough. In such circumstances, legislatures are constrained to a reactive role, at most modifying the executive’s response at the margins, but not themselves making basic policy choices. Liberal legalists sometimes urge that the executive, too, is large and unwieldy; we pointed out in the introduction that the scale of executive institutions dwarfs that of legislative and judicial institutions. On this view, the executive has no systematic advantages in speed and decisiveness. Yet this is fatally noncomparative. The executive is internally complex, but it is structured in a far more hierarchical fashion than is Congress, especially the Senate, where standard procedure requires the unanimous consent of a hundred barons, each of whom must be cosseted and appeased. In all the main cases we consider here, the executive proved capable of acting with dispatch and power, while Congress fretted, fumed, and delayed. The main implication of this contrast is that crises in the administrative state tend to follow a similar pattern. In the first stage, there is an unanticipated event requiring immediate action. Executive and administrative officials will necessarily take responsibility for the front-line response; typically, when asked to cite their legal authority for doing so, they will either resort to vague claims of inherent power or will offer creative readings of old statutes. Because legislatures come too late to the scene, old statutes enacted in different circumstances, and for different reasons, are typically all that administrators have to work with in the initial stages of a crisis. “Over time, the size and complexity of the economy will outgrow the sophistication of static financial safety buffers”54—a comment that can also be made about static security safety buffers, which the advance of weapons technology renders obsolete. In this sense, administrators also “come too late”—they are forced to “base decisions about the complex, ever-changing dynamics of contemporary economic [and, we add, security] conditions on legal relics from an oftentimes distant past.”55 Thus Franklin Roosevelt regulated banks, in 1933, by offering a creative reading of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, a statute that needless to say was enacted with different problems in mind. Likewise, when in 2008 it became apparent on short notice that the insurance giant AIG had to be bailed out, lest a systemwide meltdown occur, the Treasury and Federal Reserve had to proceed through a strained reading of a hoary 1932 statute. While the statute authorized “loans,” it did not authorize government to purchase private firms; administrators structured a transaction that in effect accomplished a purchase in the form of a loan. Ad hoc “regulation by deal,”56 especially in the first phase of the financial crisis, was accomplished under the vague authority of old statutes. The pattern holds for security matters as well as economic issues, and for issues at the intersection of the two domains. Thus after 9/11, the Bush administration’s attempts to choke off Al Qaeda’s funding initially proceeded in part under provisions of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, a 1977 statute whose purpose, when enacted, was actually to restrict the president’s power to seize property in times of crisis.57

#### Get real—this is the same Congress that tries to defund Obama care every other week—the only thing you can expect from giving war power to people like Eric Cantor is intellectual diarrhea

Gene Healy 2009 (vice president at the Cato Institute) “Reclaiming the War Power” http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2009/9/hb111-10.pdf

Each of these proposals has the merit of demanding that Congress carry the burden the Constitution places upon it: responsibility for the decision to go to war. The Gelb-Slaughter plan shows particular promise. Although Congress hasn’t declared war since 1942, reviving the formal declaration would make it harder for legislators to punt that decision to the president, as they did in Vietnam and Iraq. Hawks should see merit in making declarations mandatory, since a declaration commits those who voted for it to support the president and provide the resources he needs to prosecute the war successfully. Doves too should find much to applaud in the idea: forcing Congress to take a stand might concentrate the mind wonderfully and reduce the chances that we will find ourselves spending blood and treasure in conflicts that were not carefully examined at the outset. But we should be clear about the difficulties that comprehensive war powers reform entails. Each of these reforms presupposes a Congress eager to be held accountable for its decisions, a judiciary with a stomach for interbranch struggles, and a voting public that rewards political actors who fight to put the presidency in its place. Representative Jones’s Consti- tutional War Powers Resolution, which seeks to draw the judiciary into the struggle to constrain executive war making, ignores the Court’s resistance to congressional standing, as well as the 30-year history of litigation under the War Powers Resolution, a history that shows how adept the federal judiciary is at constructing rationales that allow it to avoid picking sides in battles between Congress and the president. Even if Jones’s Constitutional War Powers Resolution or Ely’s Combat Authorization Act could be passed today, and even if the courts, defying most past practice, grew bold enough to rule on whether hostilities were imminent, there would be still another difficulty; as Ely put it: ‘‘When we got down to cases and a court remanded the issue to Congress, would Congress actually be able to follow through and face the issue whether the war in question should be permitted to proceed? Admittedly, the matter is not entirely free from doubt.’’ It’s worth thinking about how best to tie Ulysses to the mast. But the problem with legislative schemes designed to force Congress to ‘‘do the right thing’’ is that Congress seems always to have one hand free. Statutory schemes designed to precommit legislators to particular procedures do not have a terribly promising track record. Historically, many such schemes have proved little more effective than a dieter’s note on the refrigerator. No mere statute can truly bind a future Congress, and in areas ranging from agricultural policy to balanced budgets, Congress has rarely hesitated to undo past agreements in the pursuit of short-term political advantage. A : 14431$CH10 11-11-08 14:18:58 Page 113 Layout: 14431 : Odd 113 C ATO H ANDBOOK FOR P OLICYMAKERS If checks on executive power are to be restored, we will need far less Red Team–Blue Team politicking—and many more legislators than we currently have who are willing to put the Constitution ahead of party loyalty. That in turn will depend on a public willing to hold legislators accountable for ducking war powers fights and ceding vast authority to the president. Congressional courage of the kind needed to reclaim the war power will not be forthcoming unless and until American citizens demand it.

#### Congressional attention deficit

**Pillar ’10** [Paul, 28-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), a visiting professor at Georgetown University for security studies and a member of the Center for Peace and Security Studies, PhD and MA from Princeton, “The Importance and Limits of Congressional Oversight,” Dec. 7, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/the-importance-limits-congressional-oversight-4532>]

A more commonly perceived function of oversight is whip-cracking: riding herd on executive agencies that are seen as prone to screwing up if someone else isn't nagging them about their deficiencies. But this presumed function not only is unlikely to be changed by any rearrangement of committees; it is a function that barely gets performed at all, and is unlikely ever to be performed effectively. One reason is that it assumes a superior level of dedication and/or knowledge in the legislative branch over the executive branch. One can always find centers of lousy performance, of course, that would benefit from someone else poking into the center's business. But there is no general reason to presume that executive branch managers are any less motivated than members of Congress to try to conduct the nation's business well, and there is a plenty of reason to believe that they are more knowledgeable about their particular part of the nation's business.¶ A more fundamental reason this presumed oversight function will never get performed well is that Congress is not disposed to pay good, sustained, careful attention to just about anything. With members who are distracted by countless other matters, preoccupied with the hot issues of the day, and more interested in the politics than the substance of most issues, Congressional attention is highly episodic. Even on recognizably important issues, if there is no political percentage in going into the details of the issue, attention is scant. Work of the intelligence community on Iraq, for example, that Congress would later pick apart in excruciating detail after the Bush administration's war went sour got very little attention before the war began—and other work even more relevant to the later souring got no attention at all. It is usually only after, not before, a failure or flap that Congress gets engaged. And then it engages in, as Ignatius puts it, “finger-pointing and second guessing,” which is not to be confused with oversight.¶ The intensified partisanship on Capitol Hill has made the prospects for good oversight even worse. Over three decades of dealing with the House and Senate intelligence committees, I saw a marked increase in partisanship and with it a significant deterioration in the committees' effectiveness.¶ Yes, let us hope that Congress does what it can to improve its end of intelligence and homeland security. But don't get your hopes up about how much positive difference any changes that occur will make in how well Congress does its business, much less in how well the executive branch works.

#### The public and party structures are committed to an aggressive foreign policy—it’s what the people want—and any outbreak of terrorism will turn us more neocon

McDonough 9 (David. S. McDonough, Fellow at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University, “Beyond Primacy: Hegemony and ‘Security Addiction’ in U.S. Grand Strategy”, Winter 2009, Orbis, ScienceDirect)

The reason that the current debate is currently mired in second-order issues of multilateral versus unilateral legitimacy can be attributed to the post 9/11 security environment. A grand strategy is, after all, ‘‘a state’s theory about how it can best cause security for itself.’’ 35 It would be prudent to examine why the neoconservative ‘‘theory’’ proved to be so attractive to American decision-makers after the 9/11 attacks, and why the Democrats have begun to rely on an equally primacist ‘‘theory’’ of their own. As Charles Kupchan has demonstrated, a sense of vulnerability is often directly associated with dramatic shifts in a state’s grand strategy. Kupchan is, of course, largely concerned with vulnerability to changes in the global distribution of power. 36 Even so, the 9/11 terrorist attacks have dramatically increased the U.S. sense of strategic vulnerability to both global terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and even to more traditional threats that are seen, as Donald Rumsfeld said, ‘‘in a dramatic new light–through the prism of our experience on 9/11.’’ 37 Perhaps more than any previous terrorist action, these attacks demonstrated the potential inﬂuence of non-state terrorist groups like Al Qaeda. U.S. strategic primacy makes conventional responses unattractive and ultimately futile to potential adversaries. The country’s societal vulnerability to terrorist attacks will likewise lead to extremely costly defensive reactions against otherwise limited attacks. For both the United States and its asymmetrical adversaries, the advantage clearly favors the offense over the defense. With the innumerable list of potential targets, ‘‘preemptive and preventive attacks will accomplish more against. . .[terrorists or their support structures], dollar for dollar, than the investment in passive defenses.’’ 38 As former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith has argued, a primary reliance on defense requires instrusive security measures that would inevitably endanger American civil liberties and curtail its free and open society. 39 Strategic preponderance ensures that the United States will continue to face adversaries eager to implement asymmetrical tactics, even as it offers the very resources necessary to implement both offensive and less effective defensive measures. Unfortunately, terrorist groups with strategic reach (i.e., capable of inﬂuencing the actions of states) will likely increase in the coming years due to a combination of factors, including the ‘‘democractization of technology,’’ the ‘‘privatization of war’’ and the ‘‘miniaturization of weaponry.’’ As more groups are imbued with sophisticated technological capabilities and are able to employ increasingly lethal weapons, the United States will be forced to rely even further on its unprecedented global military capabilities to eliminate this threat. The global war on terror, even with tactical successes against al Qaeda, will likely result in an inconclusive ending marked by the fragmentation and proliferation of terrorist spoiler groups. The ‘‘Israelization’’ of the United States, in which ‘‘security trumps everything,’’ will be no temporary phenomenon. 40 Realism provides an insufﬁcient means for understanding the current post-9/11 strategic threat environment and underestimates the potential impact of the terrorist threat on the American sense of vulnerability. Globalized terrorism must be confronted by proactive measures to reduce the domestic vulnerability to attack and to eliminate these organizations in their external sanctuaries. Even then, these measures will never be able to ensure ‘‘perfect security.’’ As a result, signiﬁcant public pressure for expanded security measures will arise after any attack. The United States will be consumed with what Frank Harvey has termed security addiction: ‘‘As expectations for acceptable levels of pain decrease, billions of dollars will continue to be spent by both parties in a never-ending competition to convince the American public that their party’s programs are different and more likely to succeed.’’ 41 This addiction has an important impact on the dramatically rising levels of homeland security spending. Indeed, while this increased spending is an inevitable and prudent reaction to the terrorist threat, it also creates high public expectations that will only amplify outrage in a security failure. 42 Relatedly, American strategic preponderance plays an important role in facilitating a vigorous international response to globalized terrorism, including the use of coercive military options and interventions. A primacist strategy has the dual attraction of both maximizing U.S. strategic dominance and convincing the public of a party’s national security credentials. Indeed, the Republicans had developed a strong advantage in electoral politics by its adherence to a strong military and aggressive strategy, and the Democrats in turn ‘‘learned the lesson of its vulnerability on the issue and [...] explicitly declared its devotion to national security and support for the military.’’ 43 The 9/11 attacks may not have altered the distribution of power amongst major states, but it has directly created a domestic political situation marked by an addiction to expansive security measures that are needed to satisfy increasingly high public expectations. In such a climate, it is easy to see why the neo-conservatives were so successful in selling their strategic vision. The fact that the United States has effectively settled on a grand strategy of primacy in the post-9/11 period should come as no surprise. **It is simply inconceivable that a political party could successfully advocate a grand strategy that does not embrace military preeminence and interventionism**, two factors that are seen to provide a deﬁnite advantage in the pursuit of a ‘‘global war on terror.’’ Political parties may disagree on the necessary tactics to eliminate the terrorist threat. But with increased vulnerability and security addiction, the United States will continue to embrace strategies of primacy– rather than going ‘‘beyond primacy’’–for much of the Long War.

#### Reject their psychoanalysis garbage

Adam Rosen-Carole 10, Visiting Professor of Philosophy at Bard College, 2010, “Menu Cards in Time of Famine: On Psychoanalysis and Politics,” Psychoanalytic Quarterly, Vol. LXXIX, No. 1, p. 205-207

On the other hand, though in these ways and many others, psychoanalysis seems to promote the sorts of subjective dispositions and habits requisite for a thriving democracy, and though in a variety of ways psychoanalysis contributes to personal emancipation— say, by releasing individuals from self-defeating, damaging, or petrified forms action and reaction, object attachment, and the like—in light of the very uniqueness of what it has to offer, one cannot but wonder: to what extent, if at all, can the habits and dispositions—broadly, the forms of life—cultivated by psychoanalytic practice survive, let alone flourish, under modern social and political conditions? If the emancipatory inclinations and democratic virtues that psychoanalytic practice promotes are systematically crushed or at least regularly unsupported by the world in which they would be realized, then isn’t psychoanalysis implicitly making promises it cannot redeem? Might not massive social and political transformations be the condition for the efficacious practice of psychoanalysis? And so, under current conditions, can we avoid experiencing the forms of life nascently cultivated by psychoanalytic practice as something of a tease, or even a source of deep frustration?

(2) Concerning psychoanalysis as a politically inclined theoretical enterprise, the worry is whether political diagnoses and proposals that proceed on the basis of psychoanalytic insights and forms of attention partake of a fantasy of interpretive efficacy (all the world’s a couch, you might say), wherein our profound alienation from the conditions for robust political agency are registered and repudiated?

Consider, for example, Freud and Bullitt’s (1967) assessment of the psychosexual determinants of Woodrow Wilson’s political aspirations and impediments, or Reich’s (1972) suggestion that Marxism should appeal to psychoanalysis in order to illuminate and redress neurotic phenomena that generate disturbances in working capacity, especially as this concerns religion and bourgeois sexual ideology. Also relevant are Freud’s, Žižek’s (1993, 2004), Derrida’s (2002) and others’ insistence that we draw the juridical and political consequences of the hypothesis of an irreducible death drive, as well as Marcuse’s (1970) proposal that we attend to the weakening of Eros and the growth of aggression that results from the coercive enforcement of the reality principle upon the sociopolitically weakened ego, and especially to the channeling of this aggression into hatred of enemies. Reich (1972) and Fromm (1932) suggest that psychoanalysis be employed to explore the motivations to political irrationality, especially that singular irrationality of joining the national-socialist movement, while Irigaray (1985) diagnoses the desire for the Same, the One, the Phallus as a desire for a sociosymbolic order that assures masculine dominance.

Žižek (2004) contends that only a psychoanalytic exposition of the disavowed beliefs and suppositions of the United States political elite can get at the fundamental determinants of the Iraq War. Rose (1993) argues that it was the paranoiac paradox of sensing both that there is every reason to be frightened and that everything is under control that allowed Thatcher “to make this paradox the basis of political identity so that subjects could take pleasure in violence as force and legitimacy while always locating ‘real’ violence somewhere else—illegitimate violence and illicitness increasingly made subject to the law” (p. 64). Stavrakakis (1999) advocates that we recognize and traverse the residues of utopian fantasy in our contemporary political imagination.1

Might not the psychoanalytic interpretation of powerful figures (Bush, Bin Laden, or whomever), collective subjects (nations, ethnic groups, and so forth), or urgent “political” situations register an anxiety regarding political impotence or “castration” that is pacified and modified by the fantasmatic frame wherein the psychoanalytically inclined political theorist situates him- or herself as diagnosing or interpretively intervening in the lives of political figures, collective political subjects, or complex political situations with the idealized efficacy of a successful clinical intervention? If so, then the question is: are the contributions of psychoanalytically inclined political theory anything more than tantalizing menu cards for meals it cannot deliver**?**

As I said, the worry is twofold. These are two folds of a related problem, which is this: might the very seductiveness of psychoanalytic theory and practice—specifically, the seductiveness of its political promise—register the lasting eclipse of the political and the objectivity of the social, respectively? In other words, might not everything that makes psychoanalytic theory and practice so politically attractive indicate precisely the necessity of wide-ranging social/institutional transformations that far exceed the powers of psychoanalysis?

And so, might not the politically salient transformations of subjectivity to which psychoanalysis can contribute overburden subjectivity as the site of political transformation, blinding us to the necessity of largescale institutional reforms? Indeed, might not massive institutional transformations be necessary conditions for the efficacy of psychoanalytic practice, both personally and politically? Further, might not the so-called interventions and proposals of psychoanalytically inclined political theory similarly sidestep the question of the institutional transformations necessary for their realization, and so conspire with our blindness to the enormous institutional impediments to a progressive political future?

#### This is a solvency takeout and a case turn. The act of imagination they call for overstates the political value of psychoanalysis and is a neurotic projection of personal alienation

Adam Rosen-Carole 10, Visiting Professor of Philosophy at Bard College, 2010, “Menu Cards in Time of Famine: On Psychoanalysis and Politics,” Psychoanalytic Quarterly, Vol. LXXIX, No. 1, p. 226-229

The second approach to the problem has to do with psychoanalytic contributions to political theory that avoid Freud’s methodological individualism, but nevertheless run into the same problem. An expanding trend in social criticism involves a tendency to discuss the death or aggressive drives, fantasy formations, traumas, projective identifications, defensive repudiations, and other such “psychic phenomena” of collective subjects as if such subjects were ontologically discrete and determinate. Take the following passage from Žižek (1993) as symptomatic of the trend I have in mind:

In Eastern Europe, the West seeks for its own lost origins, its own lost original experience of “democratic invention.” In other words, Eastern Europe functions for the West as its Ego-Ideal (Ich-Ideal): the point from which [the] West sees itself in a likable, idealized form, as worthy of love. The real object of fascination for the West is thus the gaze, namely the supposedly naive gaze by means of which Eastern Europe stares back at the West, fascinated by its democracy. [p. 201, italics in original]

Also, we might think here of the innumerable discussions of “America’s death drive” as propelling the recent invasions in the Middle East, or of the ways in which the motivation for the Persian Gulf Wars of the 1990s was a collective attempt “to kick the Vietnam War Syndrome”— that is, to solidify a national sense of power and prominence in the recognitive regard of the international community—or of the psychoanalytic speculations concerning the psychodynamics of various nations involved in the Cold War (here, of course, I have in mind Segal’s [1997] work), or of the collective racist fantasies and paranoiac traits that organize various nation-states’s domestic and foreign policies.7

Here are some further examples from Žižek, who, as a result of his popularity, might be said to function as a barometer of incipient trends:

• What is therefore at stake in ethnic tensions is always the possession of the national Thing. We always impute to the “other” [ethnic group, race, nation, etc.] an excessive enjoyment: he wants to steal our enjoyment (by ruining our way of life) and/or he has access to some secret, perverse enjoyment. [1993, pp. 202-203]

• Beneath the derision for the new Eastern European post- Communist states, it is easy to discern the contours of the wounded narcissism of the European “great nations.” [2004, p. 27, italics added]

• There is in fact something of a neurotic symptom in the Middle Eastern conflict—everyone recognizes the way to get rid of the obstacle, yet nonetheless, no one wants to remove it, as if there is some kind of pathological libidinal profit gained by persisting in the deadlock. [2004, p. 39, italics added]

• If there was ever a passionate attachment to the lost object, a refusal to come to terms with its loss, it is the Jewish attachment to their land and Jerusalem . . . . When the Jews lost their land and elevated it into the mythical lost object, “Jerusalem” became much more than a piece of land . . . . It becomes the stand-in for . . . all that we miss in our earthly lives. [2004, p. 41]

Rather than explore collective subjects through analyses of their individual members, this type of psychoanalytically inclined engagement with politics treats a collective subject (a nation, a region, an ethnic group, etc.) as if it were simply amenable to explanation, and perhaps even to intervention, in a manner identical to an individual psyche in a therapeutic context.

But if the transpositions of psychoanalytic concepts into political theory are epistemically questionable, as I believe they are,8 the question is: why are they so prevalent? Perhaps the psychoanalytic interpretation of collective subjects (nations, regions, etc.), or even the psychoanalytic interpretation of powerful political figures, registers a certain anxiety regarding political impotence and provokes a fantasy that, to an extent, pacifies and modifies—defends against—that anxiety. Perhaps such engagements, which are increasingly prevalent in these days of excruciating political alienation, operate within a fantasmatic frame wherein the anxiety of political exclusion and “castration”—that is, anxieties pertaining to a sense of oneself as politically inefficacious, a non-agent in most relevant senses—is both registered and mitigated by the fantasmatic satisfaction of imagining oneself interpretively intervening in the lives of political figures or collective political subjects with the efficacy of a clinically successful psychoanalytic interpretation.

To risk a hypothesis: as alienation from political efficacy increases and becomes more palpable, as our sense of ourselves as political agents diminishes, fantasies of interpretive intervention abound. Within such fantasy frames, one approaches a powerful political figure (or collective subject) as if s/he were “on the couch,” open and amenable to one’s interpretation. 9 One approaches such a powerful political figure or ethnic group or nation as if s/he (or it) desired one’s interpretations and acknowledged her/his suffering, at least implicitly, by her/his very involvement in the scene of analysis.

Or if such fantasies also provide for the satisfaction of sadistic desires provoked by political frustration and “castration” (a sense of oneself as politically voiceless, moot, uninvolved, irrelevant), as they very well might, then one’s place within the fantasy might be that of the all-powerful analyst, the sujet supposé savoir, the analyst presumptively in control of her-/himself and her/his emotions, etc. Here the analyst becomes the one who directs and organizes the analytic encounter, who commands psychoanalytic knowledge, who knows the analysand inside and out, to whom the analysand must speak, upon whom the analysand depends, who is in a position of having something to offer, whose advice—even if not directly heeded—cannot but make some sort of impact, and in the face of whom the analysand is quite vulnerable, who is thus powerful, in control . . . perhaps the very figure whom the psychoanalytically inclined interpreter fears.

Minimally, what I want to underscore here is that (1) a sense of political alienation may be registered and fantasmatically mitigated by treating political subjects, individual or collective, as if they were “on the couch”; and (2) expectations concerning the expository and therapeutic efficacy of psychoanalytic interpretations of political subjects may be conditioned by such a fantasy.

#### Terrible oversimplication to say states are collectives of individuals—proves you should have no trust in the discipline

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Cohen's work unavoidably raises the question of the status of psycho- analysis as a social or political theory, as distinct from a clinical one. Can psychoanalysis, in other words, apply to the social world of groups, institutions, nations, states and cultures in the way that it does, or at least may do, to individuals? Certainly there is now a considerable body of literature and a plethora of academic courses, and so on, claim- ing that psychoanalysis is a social theory. And, of course, in popular discourse, it is now a commonplace to hear of nations and societies spoken of in personalised ways. Thus `truth commissions' and the like, which have become so common in the past decade in countries which have undergone turbulent change, are seen as forms of national therapy or catharsis, even if this is far from being their purpose. Never- theless, the question remains: does it make sense, as Michael Ignatieff puts it, to speak of nations having psyches the way that individuals do? `Can a nation's past make people ill as we know repressed memories sometimes make individuals ill? . . . Can we speak of nations ``working through'' a civil war or an atrocity as we speak of individuals working through a traumatic memory or event?'47

The problem with the **application of psychoanalysis to social institutions** is that there can be no testing of the claims made. If someone says, for instance, that nationalism is a form of looking for and seeking to replace the body of the mother one has lost, or that the popular appeal of a particular kind of story echoes the pattern of our earliest relationship to the maternal breast, how can this be proved? The pioneers of psychoanalysis, from Freud onwards, all derived their ideas in the context of their work with individual patients and their ideas can be examined in the everyday laboratory of the therapeutic encounter where the validity of an interpretation, for example, is a matter for dialogue between therapist and patient. Outside of the consulting room, there can be no such verification process, and the further one moves from the individual patient, the less purchase psycho- analytic ideas can have. Outside the therapeutic encounter, anything and everything can be true, psychoanalytically speaking. But if every- thing is true, then nothing can be false and therefore nothing can be true.

#### No risk of superpower syndrome and their hardline anti-Obama stance only causes backlash

Robert J. Lifton 11, aff guy, 2011, Witness to an Extreme Century: A Memoir, p. 405-406

With all of the American angst during the first year or so of the Obama administration, one may readily forget the power of the historical moment of his election in 2008. BJ and I had a few friends in to watch the returns on the sleek television set in our living room, which we had purchased four years earlier for a similar gathering that had resulted in a roomful of despair and suspicion of fraud in relation to the Bush victory. But this time, in 2008, the television set did not betray us, and my reaction of not just joy but ecstasy, including tears, was hardly mine alone. What was special to me, though, was the quick realization that the outcome meant an end to the country's superpower syndrome. But was that the case? Only partly, it turns out. Certainly Obama and his administration have renounced the principle of American omnipotence in favor of more modest claims about our capacities and influence in the world. Apocalypticism and totalistic behavior have given way to something closer to Camus's "philosophy of limits" with an acceptance of ambiguity, nuance, and complexity. And most important, there has been a specific rejection of nuclearism and a call for abolition of the weapons.

Yet despite all that, the syndrome lingers in crucial areas that specifically connect with my work. Concerning nuclear abolition, Obama has not followed through with clear American policies, despite an impressive convocation of world leaders on the subject of nuclear danger. On revelations of torture, and more recently of illegitimate medical experiments in relation to torture, Obama has mostly tried to sidestep the issue and avoid legal culpability of those involved. Finally, his decision to send added troops to Afghanistan seems to me to be the stuff of war-making, and atrocity-producing, blunder. In all three cases there is a certain clinging to the very American omnipotence being renounced. I have found myself torn between joining a considerable segment of the left in a condemnation of shortcomings that perpetuate elements of the superpower syndrome, and an alternative inclination to defend Obama as an incremental reformer who needs more time.

**I took the latter position** in a series of discussions with Howard Zinn, who denounced Obama as "a Chicago politician" and a hypocrite. I still don't agree with that judgment but I am also willing to take a public stand of strong opposition to Obama policies on Afghanistan and on American torture and recently revealed experimentation. Yet I remain sensitive as well to the importance of supporting the Obama administration in the face of new waves of right-wing American totalism and potential violence in the backlash over the election of our first African-American president.

#### No impact – Lifton is all rhetoric

Ira Chernus, Univ. of Colorado Boulder, Journal of the American Academy of Religion Dec 2004

All of the hallmarks of Lifton's work are here: careful research, deft interweaving of psychology and politics, stimulating insights, a fluid readable style, and above it all a sensitive conscience pointing toward a better human future. As always, Lifton's rhetoric is so compelling that it seems to offer a powerful analytical argument. As so often, though, there is ultimately more fine rhetoric than fine logical argumentation. Trying to reconstruct Lifton's logic with analytical precision is often like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall. This may be a minor sin in a writer with such a refined moral compass and such a large audience. But for those who study the interface between contemporary politics and religion, the result is a somewhat frustrating mix of sharp insight and murky overall argument. Lifton's master trope here is "apocalypticism" (hence the subtitle: "America's Apocalyptic Confrontation with the World"). He finds a worldwide trend toward apocalypticism throughout the twentieth century. He warns that the Bush administration accelerated this trend by pushing U.S. policy far too much in apocalyptic directions. But what, precisely, is this apocalypticism? At times, Lifton seems to be talking about the classic Jewish and Christian vision of apocalypse: a cataclysm that destroys the entire existing world to usher in a new and perfect world. Most often, though, he uses the words apocalypse and apocalyptic more loosely to refer to any act of large-scale violence intended to purify some part of the world of evil and thereby renew it. Although Lifton always places acts of apocalyptic violence in their particular historical contexts, he has little interest in analyzing or classifying the differences among them. His persistent theme is to find a psychological thread connecting all apocalyptic gestures. All are ultimately efforts to fend off vulnerability, particularly vulnerability to death, he suggests; all aim at transcendent life. But all apocalyptic believers know, if only unconsciously, that their gestures are futile. Therefore, they are very likely to feel threatened and see themselves as potential or actual victims. To still their own doubts (and guilt feelings), they identify the threat as coming from some evil other. Then they set out to erase their doubts by destroying that other. Apocalypticists also battle their death anxiety by identifying themselves with God or some equally cosmic force or symbol. This totalizing impulse constantly raises the stakes: every frustration becomes evidence of radical victimization at the hands of absolute evil. The logical response is to plan greater acts of violence commensurate with the scale of the victimization and evil. So the whole process must unfold on a grandiose scale, creating visions of a final battle between global good and global evil. Thus apocalypticists see themselves as serving the ultimate force in control of history; they wield their violence to bring history to a purified, perfect end. This is all very thought-provoking stuff (though perhaps familiar to specialists in apocalyptic studies). And Lifton hangs numerous smaller insights on his overall structure. But when he comes to the meat of his subject—the conflict between the U.S. government and "Islamic terrorists" as represented by Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda—the structure sometimes seems to run too quickly past demonstrable facts. For Lifton, the violent form of jihad practiced by Al-Qaeda and other Islamist groups reflects "a powerful, amorphous impulse to destroy a tainted world and renew it through Islamist purity" (75). This impulse emerges from Muslims' sense of humiliation at the hands of the West. Yet Lifton's own words, and words he cites from Muslims and scholars of Islam, suggest that the dominant impulse in today's violent jihad is not an aggressive effort to transform the world. It is, rather, "a defense of the worldwide Islamic community ... an impulse to reassert the health of Islam" (75, 82), aiming to return Muslim lands to the purity of a "holy era, the founding period" (78). The battle must continue "until all other lands that were Muslim are returned to us so that Islam will reign again" (79). Although Lifton is usually quite respectful of empirical political facts, here he barely mentions the specific grievances voiced repeatedly by Osama bin Laden: U.S. troops stationed in Muslim lands, the U.S. attack on Iraq through both military force and economic sanctions, and U.S. support for the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Those goals comport well with a defensive stance. There is no convincing evidence that violent Islamists want to wreak violence on non-Muslims in order to destroy the world as we know it and pave the way for global Muslim domination. Yet that is the erroneous impression so many Americans have. By forcing the data into his vaguely defined and generalized model of apocalypticism, Lifton may inadvertently reinforce that error. Nearly half the book is devoted to the response to Al-Qaeda under George W. Bush after September 11. Here, too, Lifton finds humiliation the key: "The 'war on terrorism' represents an impulse to undo violently precisely the humiliation ofthat day" (107). The feeling of vulnerability and death anxiety spawned on 9/11 was especially galling because such things are not supposed to happen to a superpower. Possession of overwhelming nuclear power has imbued the United States with a "superpower syndrome," a sense that we have a right to eternal invulnerability and control of history. The 9/11 attack challenged that assumption and turned all Americans into survivors. Lifton brings all his previous psychological analyses of the survivor's anxiety, numbing, and guilt to bear here quite effectively. He suggests that the need to find meaning in survival reinforces the innate American tendency to believe in America's sacred mission and to seek national regeneration through violence. He offers specific evidence that the George W. Bush administration leaned heavily on these traditions to promote its "war on terrorism." Ultimately, he claims, the Bush administration sought "an empire oí fluid world control... total sway over human endeavors" (175,177). In the course of explaining why Bush and his advisers were so powerfully driven to military solutions for every problem, Lifton offers a damning indictment of Bush policy and a persuasive explanation of its dangers. The "war on terrorism" is perhaps most dangerous because it is self-perpetuating and therefore self-defeating. It has created "a sense of fear and insecurity among Americans, which is then mobilized in support of further aggressive plans" (115). We must continue to fight against "evil" to cleanse ourselves of our own fear as well as humiliation. Therefore, this is a war "without limits of time or place ... it has no clear end" (112). But is apocalypticism indeed the master key here? Again, Lifton's own words suggest an alternative view: "The war on terrorism, then, took amorphous impulses toward combating terrorism and used them as a pretext for realizing a prior mission aimed at American global hegemony . . . spreading our own version of democracy and open markets" (114, 121). This is a mission that any U.S. president would have pursued both before and after 9/11. Bush and company gave it a more apocalyptic tinge than others might (as Lifton demonstrates at length), and this led to somewhat more militaristic and unilateralist policies. However, the hegemonic mission was created before George W. Bush was born, for essentially the same kind of reason that Al-Qaeda wages its jihad: to defend what U.S. leaders believed to be the one true and right way to live and to defend the nations where that true and right way of life is practiced. Unlike Al-Qaeda, the U.S. foreign policy elite does demand that its hegemony encompass the whole world. According to its faith, any challenge to global democratic capitalism could well be the seed ofthat precarious system's demise. Apart from this one difference, the two opposing systems are in many ways mirror images, as Lifton suggests. And he is right that both now employ elements of apocalypticism to legitimate their violence. But it seems misleading to describe this as essentially a conflict of competing apocalyptic systems. It is far more a conflict of competing defensive systems, each built on a master narrative that casts the other as the major threat to its existence. An analysis starting from this premise, incorporating many of Lifton's very helpful insights along the way, would take us far to understanding the complex web of political, psychological, and religious threads that weave together to create the reality of our world.

#### Cant change the minds of the electorate

Ferguson 2009 (Niall, American Interest, http://www.the-american-interest.com/ai2/article.cfm?Id=335&MId=16)

So much for the American predicament. What of Posen’s alternative grand strategy based on American self-restraint? The terms he uses are themselves revealing. The United States needs to be more “reticent” about its use of military force, more “modest” about its political goals overseas, more “distant” from traditional allies, and more “stingy” in its aid policies. Good luck to the presidential candidate who laces his next foreign policy speech with those adjectives: “My fellow Americans, I want to make this great country of ours more reticent, modest, distant and stingy!” Let us, however, leave aside this quintessentially academic and operationally useless rhetoric. What exactly does Posen want the United States to do? I count six concrete recommendations. The United States should: 1) Abandon the Bush Doctrine of “preemption”, which in the case of Iraq has been a policy of preventive war. Posen argues that this applies even in cases of nuclear proliferation. By implication, he sees preventive war as an inferior option to deterrence, though he does not make clear how exactly a nuclear-armed Iran would be deterred, least of all if his second recommendation were to be implemented. 2) Reduce U.S. military presence in the Middle East (“the abode of Islam”) by abandoning “its permanent and semi-permanent land bases in Arab countries.” Posen does not say so, but he appears to imply the abandonment of all these bases, not just the ones in Iraq, but also those in, for example, Qatar. It is not clear what would be left of Central Command after such a drastic retreat. Note that this would represent a break with the policy not just of the last two Presidents, but with that of the last 12. 3) Ramp up efforts to provide relief in the wake of natural disasters, exemplified by Operation Unified Assistance after the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004. No doubt the American military did some good in the wake of the tsunami, but Posen needs to explain why a government that so miserably bungled the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina less than a year later should be expected to be consistently effective in the wake of natural disasters. 4) Assist in humanitarian military interventions only “under reasonable guidelines” and “in coalitions, operating under some kind of regional or international political mandate.” Does Posen mean that he would favor sending American troops to Darfur at the same time as he is withdrawing them from other “abodes of Islam?” He does not say. 5) Promote not democracy abroad but “the rule of law, press freedom and the rights of collective bargaining.” Here again I am experiencing cognitive dissonance. The government that sought systematically to evade the Geneva Conventions in order to detain indefinitely and torture suspected terrorists as an upholder of the rule of law? 6) Stop offering “U.S. security guarantees and security assistance, [which] tend to relieve others of the need to do more to ensure their own security.” This is in fact the most important of all Posen’s recommendations, though he saves it until last. He envisages radical diminution of American support for other members of NATO. Over the next ten years, he writes, the United States “should gradually withdraw from all military headquarters and commands in Europe.” In the same timeframe it should “reduce U.S. government direct financial assistance to Israel to zero”, as well as reducing (though not wholly eliminating) assistance to Egypt. And it should “reconsider its security relationship with Japan”, whatever that means. Again, this represents a break with traditional policy so radical that it would impress even Noam Chomsky, to say nothing of Osama bin Laden (who would, indeed, find little here to object to). Posen, in other words, has proceeded from relatively familiar premises (the limits of American “hyperpower”) to some quite fantastic policy recommendations, which are perhaps best summed up as a cross between isolationism and humanitarianism. Only slightly less fantastic than his vision of an American military retreat from the Middle East, Europe and East Asia is Posen’s notion that it could be sold to the American electorate—just six years after they were the targets of the single largest terrorist attack in history—in the language of self-effacement. Coming from a man who wants to restart mainstream debate on American grand strategy, that is pretty rich.

## \*\*\*1NR

### 1NR Impact Overview

#### GOP takeover erodes liberal internationalism, results in violent protectionism and risks strikes on Iran – turns the whole case

**Mead, Bard foreign affairs professor, 2011**

(Walter Russell, “The Tea Party and American Foreign Policy: What Populism Means for Globalism”, Foreign Affairs, March/April, ebsco, ldg)

Any increase in Jacksonian political strength makes a military response to the Iranian nuclear program more likely. Although the public's reaction to the progress of North Korea's nuclear program has been relatively mild, recent polls show that up to 64 percent of the U.S. public favors military strikes to end the Iranian nuclear program. Deep public concerns over oil and Israel, combined with memories of the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis among older Americans, put Iran's nuclear program in Jacksonians' cross hairs. Polls show that more than 50 percent of the public believes the United States should defend Israel against Iran--even if Israel sets off hostilities by launching the first strike. Many U.S. presidents have been dragged into war reluctantly by aroused public opinion; to the degree that Congress and the public are influenced by Jacksonian ideas, a president who allows Iran to get nuclear weapons without using military action to try to prevent it would face political trouble. (Future presidents should, however, take care. Military engagements undertaken without a clear strategy for victory can backfire disastrously. Lyndon Johnson committed himself to war in Southeast Asia because he believed, probably correctly, that Jacksonian fury at a communist victory in Vietnam would undermine his domestic goals. The story did not end well.) On other issues, Paulites and Palinites are united in their dislike for liberal internationalism--the attempt to conduct international relations through multilateral institutions under an ever-tightening web of international laws and treaties. From climate change to the International Criminal Court to the treatment of enemy combatants captured in unconventional conflicts, both wings of the Tea Party reject liberal internationalist ideas and will continue to do so. The U.S. Senate, in which each state is allotted two senators regardless of the state's population, heavily favors the less populated states, where Jacksonian sentiment is often strongest. The United States is unlikely to ratify many new treaties written in the spirit of liberal internationalism for some time to come. The new era in U.S. politics could see foreign policy elites struggling to receive a hearing for their ideas from a skeptical public. "The Council on Foreign Relations," the pundit Beck said in January 2010, "was a progressive idea of, let's take media and eggheads and figure out what the idea is, what the solution is, then teach it to the media, and they'll let the masses know what should be done." Tea Partiers intend to be vigilant to insure that elites with what the movement calls their "one-world government" ideas and bureaucratic agendas of class privilege do not dominate foreign policy debates. The United States may return to a time when prominent political leaders found it helpful to avoid too public an association with institutions and ideas perceived as distant from, and even hostile to, the interests and values of Jacksonian America. Concern about China has been growing for some time in American opinion, and the Jacksonian surge makes it more likely that the simmering anger and resentment will come to a boil. Free trade is an issue that has historically divided populists in the United States (agrarians have tended to like it; manufacturing workers have not); even though Jacksonians like to buy cheap goods at Walmart, common sense largely leads them to believe that the first job of trade negotiators ought to be to preserve U.S. jobs rather than embrace visionary "win-win" global schemes.

#### That’s key to progressive victories on immigration and other issues.

Wilson and Rucker 2013

Scott and Phillip, Washington Post, Stymied by a GOP House, Obama looks ahead to 2014 to cement his legacy, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-02/politics/37386684\_1\_president-obama-white-house-democratic-control

President Obama, now facing the consequences of automatic spending cuts and the complications they raise for his broader domestic agenda, is taking the most specific steps of his administration in an attempt to ensure the election of a Democratic­-controlled Congress in two years. “What I can’t do is force Congress to do the right thing,” Obama told reporters at the White House on Friday after a fruitless meeting with Republican leaders to avert the country’s latest fiscal crisis, known as the sequester. “The American people may have the capacity to do that.” Obama, fresh off his November reelection, began almost at once executing plans to win back the House in 2014, which he and his advisers believe will be crucial to the outcome of his second term and to his legacy as president. He is doing so by trying to articulate for the American electorate his own feelings — an exasperation with an opposition party that blocks even the most politically popular elements of his agenda. Obama has committed to raising money for fellow Democrats, agreed to help recruit viable candidates, and launched a political nonprofit group dedicated to furthering his agenda and that of his congressional allies. The goal is to flip the Republican-held House back to Democratic control, allowing Obama to push forward with a progressive agenda on gun control, immigration, climate change and the economy during his final two years in office, according to congressional Democrats, strategists and others familiar with Obama’s thinking. “The president understands that to get anything done, he needs a Democratic majority in the House of Representatives,” said Rep. Steve Israel (N.Y.), chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. “To have a legacy in 2016, he will need a House majority in 2014, and that work has to start now.”

#### Lack of CIR means racism and xenophobia fills in turning the case – Arizona proves.

Noorani ’10 (14 June, 2010 “We must continue increasing our pressure” for a Inmigration Reform in the US Economy & Politics, International, Opinion & Interviews View Comments “Why We Must Continue Pushing for Comprehensive Immigration Reform” By Ali Noorani / Via Change Photo: Korean Resource Center

Comunicas.- There are 11 million undocumented immigrants living in the United States today. And there are 279 Congressional votes standing between those people and the American dream. The fight for those 279 votes that 11 million people need has been long and tough, but now, more than ever, is the time for our courage and leadership. In April, Arizona enshrined racial profiling into law — and awakened millions to the current civil rights crisis the immigrant community is facing in our country. Arizona changed the game and brought the urgency of our fight to a fever pitch. Since then, at least 18 states have considered legislation similar to the Arizona law. The lack of political courage from both the White House and members of Congress to tackle immigration reform has left a vacuum that states like Arizona are rushing to fill with their own measures — and these measures mostly focus only on enforcement with no thought given to families and workers. Immigration is no longer a policy debate; it is a political battle with clear choices: Legalization or criminalization. Justice for all or racial profiling. Family unity or family separation. We, as advocates, also have a clear choice. We can negotiate with ourselves and entice our opponents to the table by proposing piecemeal options. But, an effort to push anything short of a comprehensive overhaul of our broken system would both give our opponents a reprieve from working on a bi-partisan solution to one of our nation’s most pressing problems and give our allies the choice of checking off the “immigration” box on their to-do list without having fully addressed the issue. Anything less than full legalization of the 11 million undocumented immigrants is unacceptable, and we should not demand anything less. We have a moral obligation to push for real reform that brings justice to all of our communities. We won’t allow the inaction of Congress to force us into negotiating away our power. The courage of those 11 million people is our power. If we back off from organizing the entire community, we will fail to create — much less take advantage of — the opportunities that lie ahead. The American public has shown that they are in favor of immigration reform with a pathway to legalization. Our communities have stood up and made their voices heard. Arizona has ignited the 21st century fight for civil rights. Now is the time for our lawmakers to step up and stop putting politics above what is right and just. We must continue increasing our pressure. There are no lack of options in front of the President and Congress to legalize the undocumented, keep families together and reform our immigration system in the interests of our nation. There is only a lack conviction. And it’s up to us, as immigration rights advocates, to force them to do the right thing, and bring real, comprehensive reform to all 11 million undocumented immigrants, leaving no one behind.

### 1NR Change Minds

#### Making terror an issue means ALL CANDIDATES have to deal with challengers from the right. Means even if Democrats still win they’ll be conservative assholes.

Reinhard 2013

Beth, National Journal, Democrats Argue Over Who's Tougher on National Security After Boston Bombings, http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/democrats-argue-over-who-s-tougher-on-national-security-after-boston-bombings-20130423

The last time terrorists struck while Massachusetts Democrat Stephen Lynch was campaigning for office, on Sept. 11, 2001, he coasted. He easily won the Democratic primary that day and clinched a seat in Congress with a gauzy television ad in the general election that intoned, "At a time like this, we're not Democrats or Republicans. We're Americans." This time, when bombs exploded at the Boston Marathon in the homestretch of Lynch’s underdog campaign for the U.S Senate, he pounced. After a week’s hiatus from the campaign trail, Lynch assailed his Democratic rival, Rep. Edward Markey, in a televised debate Monday for voting against the creation of an anti-terrorism task force in 2002. The unexpected attack -- expected to be replayed in the second and final debate of the primary Tuesday night -- is shaking up the quiet special election to replace now-Secretary of State John Kerry and could help Lynch close a double-digit gap in the polls by Tuesday’s vote. “Clearly, the terrorist attack has given Lynch new purpose and energy in his campaign, which until this time had been flat,” said Boston-based Republican strategist Rob Gray, who is not involved in the race. “Anything can happen in a low-turnout special-election primary, especially given the focus on the marathon bombings, though I still think Markey is the favorite.” Lynch’s campaign faces a challenge familiar to politicians who have campaigned in the chaotic aftermath of natural disasters and acts of violence: how to draw the attention of a shell-shocked electorate without appearing to be exploiting a tragedy for political gain. What’s less customary is that the soft-on-terrorism line of attack is usually wielded by hawkish Republicans against more liberal Democrats. In this Democratic primary, bright lines already separate the more liberal Markey and more conservative Lynch on abortion rights, President Obama’s health care law and the Keystone XL Pipeline. “I was waiting for the terrorism card to be played in the general election and didn’t expect this sort of intraparty maneuver on the part of Rep. Lynch,” said Tim Vercellotti, a political science professor at Western New England University, which found Lynch trailing Markey by 10 percentage points in a mid-April survey. The more familiar political backbiting over the government’s response to terrorism was last seen in the 2010 Massachusetts Senate race, when Republican Scott Brown accused Democrat Martha Coakley of being naïve about terrorist threats. Raising the issue of homeland security in next week’s Democratic primary could motivate independent voters who are eligible to participate and lean toward the more conservative Lynch. “The news cycle is still absolutely dominated by coverage of the investigation, so for folks like Steve Lynch it’s really hard to get some traction,” Vercellotti added. “If he were to put an ad on the air he’d be playing with fire because he runs the risk of politicizing an event that’s still really raw, but emotions are high and it could resonate. It’s tricky.” Markey’s campaign is vigorously defending his record on national security, pointing to his legislation to require better screening of airport cargo, opposition to allowing small knives on planes and advocacy for increased security at nuclear power plants. Only 33 Democrats voted for the anti-terrorism task force in 2002 because of concerns about U.S. military involvement in local law enforcement issues, said Markey spokesman Andrew Zucker. “Steven Lynch’s personal attack on Markey’s national leadership on stopping terrorism and keeping Americans safe is a clear sign of desperation from a candidate with nowhere left to turn,” he said. The Lynch campaign disagreed. “We just spent a weekend watching the interaction between local and federal agencies, so talking about the candidates’ differences on that policy is very relevant,” said Lynch’s spokesman, Scott Ferson. “I guess we could have had another debate over the health care law, but now we are having a very different debate.” The issue is also creeping into the Republican primary, which pits businessman Gabriel Gomez against former U.S. Attorney Michael Sullivan and State Rep. Dan Winslow. Gomez, a former Navy SEAL, has said he was “disappointed” the federal government won’t be holding the surviving bomber suspect as an enemy combatant. Sullivan has called for revoking his citizenship. "The bombing has completely transformed the race and brought national security and homeland defense to the forefront,” said Republican strategist Eric Fehrnstrom, who is working for a pro-Gomez super PAC. “I think it will increase participation in the special election because you will see more independents turn out. People are playing closer attention now and they are going to be scrutinizing the candidates’ records on homeland security and national defense issues.”

### 1NR A2: No Extinction

#### Climate change causes extinction - flooding, oceans, hot house earth – our evidence assumes their defense

Farley 2010

John, Professor of physics and astronomy @ UNLV, Monthly Review Vol 62 issue 4 september 2010 <http://monthlyreview.org/2010/09/01/our-last-chance-to-save-humanity>

If the sea level rises 70 meters (250 feet), it would not extinguish all human life. After all, hominids have existed on earth for several million years, and homo sapiens more than a hundred thousand, surviving numerous ice ages, during which ice sheets a mile thick covered areas that came to be Boston and New York City. But the world population during the last ice age, ten thousand years ago, has been estimated at five million. It is now six billion. It is human civilization that is unlikely to survive a flooding catastrophe.

According to the penultimate chapter, The Venus Syndrome, it might be even worse. Hansen posits a possible future earth, in which a “runaway greenhouse effect” takes over: anthropogenic global warming from greenhouse gases causes increased water vapor in the atmosphere, which in turn causes further warming. The methane clathrate deposits are destabilized, releasing vast amounts of methane in the atmosphere. The oceans become acidified by dissolution of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. This could eliminate all life on Earth.

This is speculation, of course. But Venus, the planet most similar to earth, has a very strong greenhouse effect, much stronger than earth’s. In the absence of atmospheric greenhouse gases, the surface temperature of the earth would be -18°C (0°F). The actual observed temperature of the Earth is 15°C (59°F). Thus, the greenhouse effect on the Earth raises the temperature by 33°C (59°F). On Venus, the surface temperature, in the absence of the greenhouse effect, would be -41°C (-42°F), well below the melting point of ice. A very strong greenhouse effect raises the surface temperature to the observed temperature of 464°C (867°F). The greenhouse effect on Venus is a staggering 505°C (909°F), creating a planetary surface hot enough to melt lead (!!), which requires “only” 327°C (621°F).

Global warming will cause extinction -- scientific consensus that it’s real and anthropogenic.  
Morgan, 2009  
[Dennis Ray, Professor of Current Affairs @ Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, South Korea, “World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race”, Futures, Volume 41, Issue 10, December 2009, Pages 683-693, ScienceDirect]  
As horrifying as the scenario of human extinction by sudden, fast-burning nuclear fire may seem, the one consolation is that this future can be avoided within a relatively short period of time if responsible world leaders change Cold War thinking to move away from aggressive wars over natural resources and towards the eventual dismantlement of most if not all nuclear weapons. On the other hand, another scenario of human extinction by fire is one that may not so easily be reversed within a short period of time because it is not a fast-burning fire; rather, a slow burning fire is gradually heating up the planet as industrial civilization progresses and develops globally. This gradual process and course is long-lasting; thus it cannot easily be changed, even if responsible world leaders change their thinking about ‘‘progress’’ and industrial development based on the burning of fossil fuels. The way that global warming will impact humanity in the future has often been depicted through the analogy of the proverbial frog in a pot of water who does not realize that the temperature of the water is gradually rising. Instead of trying to escape, the frog tries to adjust to the gradual temperature change; finally, the heat of the water sneaks up on it until it is debilitated. Though it finally realizes its predicament and attempts to escape, it is too late; its feeble attempt is to no avail— and the frog dies. Whether this fable can actually be applied to frogs in heated water or not is irrelevant; it still serves as a comparable scenario of how the slow burning fire of global warming may eventually lead to a runaway condition and take humanity by surprise. Unfortunately, by the time the politicians finally all agree with the scientific consensus that global warming is indeed human caused, its development could be too advanced to arrest; the poor frog has become too weak and enfeebled to get himself out of hot water. The Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 1988 by the WorldMeteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environmental Programme to ‘‘assess on a comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis the scientific, technical and socio-economic information relevant to understanding the scientific basis of risk of humaninduced climate change, its potential impacts and options for adaptation and mitigation.’’[16]. Since then, it has given assessments and reports every six or seven years. Thus far, it has given four assessments.13 With all prior assessments came attacks fromsome parts of the scientific community, especially by industry scientists, to attempt to prove that the theory had no basis in planetary history and present-day reality; nevertheless, as more andmore research continually provided concrete and empirical evidence to confirm the global warming hypothesis, that it is indeed human-caused, mostly due to the burning of fossil fuels, the scientific consensus grew stronger that human induced global warming is verifiable. As a matter of fact, according to Bill McKibben [17], 12 years of ‘‘impressive scientific research’’ strongly confirms the 1995 report ‘‘that humans had grown so large in numbers and especially in appetite for energy that they were now damaging the most basic of the earth’s systems—the balance between incoming and outgoing solar energy’’; ‘‘. . . their findings have essentially been complementary to the 1995 report – a constant strengthening of the simple basic truth that humans were burning too much fossil fuel.’’ [17]. Indeed, 12 years later, the 2007 report not only confirms global warming, with a stronger scientific consensus that the slow burn is ‘‘very likely’’ human caused, but it also finds that the ‘‘amount of carbon in the atmosphere is now increasing at a faster rate even than before’’ and the temperature increases would be ‘‘considerably higher than they have been so far were it not for the blanket of soot and other pollution that is temporarily helping to cool the planet.’’ [17]. Furthermore, almost ‘‘everything frozen on earth is melting. Heavy rainfalls are becoming more common since the air is warmer and therefore holds more water than cold air, and ‘cold days, cold nights and frost have become less frequent, while hot days, hot nights, and heat waves have become more frequent.’’ [17]. Unless drastic action is taken soon, the average global temperature is predicted to rise about 5 degrees this century, but it could rise as much as 8 degrees. As has already been evidenced in recent years, the rise in global temperature is melting the Arctic sheets. This runaway polar melting will inflict great damage upon coastal areas,

which could be much greater than what has been previously forecasted. However, what is missing in the IPCC report, as dire as it may seem, is sufficient emphasis on the less likely but still plausible worst case scenarios, which could prove to have the most devastating, catastrophic consequences for the long-term future of human civilization. In other words, the IPCC report places too much emphasis on a linear progression that does not take sufficient account of the dynamics of systems theory, which leads to a fundamentally different premise regarding the relationship between industrial civilization and nature. As a matter of fact, as early as the 1950s, Hannah Arendt [18] observed this radical shift of emphasis in the human-nature relationship, which starkly contrasts with previous times because the very distinction between nature and man as ‘‘Homo faber’’ has become blurred, as man no longer merely takes from nature what is needed for fabrication; instead, he now acts into nature to augment and transform natural processes, which are then directed into the evolution of human civilization itself such that we become a part of the very processes that we make. The more human civilization becomes an integral part of this dynamic system, the more difficult it becomes to extricate ourselves from it. As Arendt pointed out, this dynamism is dangerous because of its unpredictability. Acting into nature to transform natural processes brings about an . . . endless new change of happenings whose eventual outcome the actor is entirely incapable of knowing or controlling beforehand. The moment we started natural processes of our own - and the splitting of the atom is precisely such a man-made natural process -we not only increased our power over nature, or became more aggressive in our dealings with the given forces of the earth, but for the first time have taken nature into the human world as such and obliterated the defensive boundaries between natural elements and the human artifice by which all previous civilizations were hedged in’’ [18]. So, in as much as we act into nature, we carry our own unpredictability into our world; thus, Nature can no longer be thought of as having absolute or iron-clad laws. We no longer know what the laws of nature are because the unpredictability of Nature increases in proportion to the degree by which industrial civilization injects its own processes into it; through selfcreated, dynamic, transformative processes, we carry human unpredictability into the future with a precarious recklessness that may indeed end in human catastrophe or extinction, for elemental forces that we have yet to understand may be unleashed upon us by the very environment that we experiment with. Nature may yet have her revenge and the last word, as the Earth and its delicate ecosystems, environment, and atmosphere reach a tipping point, which could turn out to be a point of no return. This is exactly the conclusion reached by the scientist, inventor, and author, James Lovelock. The creator of the wellknown yet controversial Gaia Theory, Lovelock has recently written that it may be already too late for humanity to change course since climate centers around the world, . . . which are the equivalent of the pathology lab of a hospital, have reported the Earth’s physical condition, and the climate specialists see it as seriously ill, and soon to pass into a morbid fever that may last as long as 100,000 years. I have to tell you, as members of the Earth’s family and an intimate part of it, that you and especially civilisation are in grave danger. It was ill luck that we started polluting at a time when the sun is too hot for comfort. We have given Gaia a fever and soon her condition will worsen to a state like a coma. She has been there before and recovered, but it took more than 100,000 years. We are responsible and will suffer the consequences: as the century progresses, the temperature will rise 8 degrees centigrade in temperate regions and 5 degrees in the tropics. Much of the tropical land mass will become scrub and desert, and will no longer serve for regulation; this adds to the 40 per cent of the Earth’s surface we have depleted to feed ourselves. . . . Curiously, aerosol pollution of the northern hemisphere reduces global warming by reflecting sunlight back to space. This ‘global dimming’ is transient and could disappear in a few days like the smoke that it is, leaving us fully exposed to the heat of the global greenhouse. We are in a fool’s climate, accidentally kept cool by smoke, and before this century is over billions of us will die and the few breeding pairs of people that survive will be in the Arctic where the climate remains tolerable. [19] Moreover, Lovelock states that the task of trying to correct our course is hopelessly impossible, for we are not in charge. It is foolish and arrogant to think that we can regulate the atmosphere, oceans and land surface in order to maintain the conditions right for life. It is as impossible as trying to regulate your own temperature and the composition of your blood, for those with ‘‘failing kidneys know the never-ending daily difficulty of adjusting water, salt and protein intake. The technological fix of dialysis helps, but is no replacement for living healthy kidneys’’ [19]. Lovelock concludes his analysis on the fate of human civilization and Gaia by saying that we will do ‘‘our best to survive, but sadly I cannot see the United States or the emerging economies of China and India cutting back in time, and they are the main source of emissions. The worst will happen and survivors will have to adapt to a hell of a climate’’ [19]. Lovelock’s forecast for climate change is based on a systems dynamics analysis of the interaction between humancreated processes and natural processes. It is a multidimensional model that appropriately reflects the dynamism of industrial civilization responsible for climate change. For one thing, it takes into account positive feedback loops that lead to ‘‘runaway’’ conditions. This mode of analysis is consistent with recent research on how ecosystems suddenly disappear. A 2001 article in Nature, based on a scientific study by an international consortium, reported that changes in ecosystems are not just gradual but are often sudden and catastrophic [20]. Thus, a scientific consensus is emerging (after repeated studies of ecological change) that ‘‘stressed ecosystems, given the right nudge, are capable of slipping rapidly from a seemingly steady state to something entirely different,’’ according to Stephen Carpenter, a limnologist at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (who is also a co-author of the report). Carpenter continues, ‘‘We realize that there is a common pattern we’re seeing in ecosystems around the world, . . . Gradual changes in vulnerability accumulate and eventually you get a shock to the system - a flood or a drought - and, boom, you’re over into another regime. It becomes a self-sustaining collapse.’’ [20]. If ecosystems are in fact mini-models of the system of the Earth, as Lovelock maintains, then we can expect the same kind of behavior. As Jonathon Foley, a UW-Madison climatologist and another co-author of the Nature report, puts it, ‘‘Nature isn’t linear. Sometimes you can push on a system and push on a system and, finally, you have the straw that breaks the camel’s back.’’ Also, once the ‘‘flip’’ occurs, as Foley maintains, then the catastrophic change is ‘‘irreversible.’’ [20]. When we expand this analysis of ecosystems to the Earth itself, it’s frightening. What could be the final push on a stressed system that could ‘‘break the camel’s back?’’ Recently, another factor has been discovered in some areas of the arctic regions, which will surely compound the problem of global ‘‘heating’’ (as Lovelock calls it) in unpredictable and perhaps catastrophic ways. This disturbing development, also reported in Nature, concerns the permafrost that has locked up who knows how many tons of the greenhouse gasses, methane and carbon dioxide. Scientists are particularly worried about permafrost because, as it thaws, it releases these gases into the atmosphere, thus, contributing and accelerating global heating. It is a vicious positive feedback loop that compounds the prognosis of global warming in ways that could very well prove to be the tipping point of no return. Seth Borenstein of the Associated Press describes this disturbing positive feedback loop of permafrost greenhouse gasses, as when warming ‘‘. already under way thaws permafrost, soil that has been continuously frozen for thousands of years. Thawed permafrost releases methane and carbon dioxide. Those gases reach the atmosphere and help trap heat on Earth in the greenhouse effect. The trapped heat thaws more permafrost and so on.’’ [21]. The significance and severity of this problem cannot be understated since scientists have discovered that ‘‘the amount of carbon trapped in this type of permafrost called ‘‘yedoma’’ is much more prevalent than originally thought and may be 100 times [my emphasis] the amount of carbon released into the air each year by the burning of fossil fuels’’ [21]. Of course, it won’t come out all at once, at least by time as we commonly reckon it, but in terms of geological time, the ‘‘several decades’’ that scientists say it will probably take to come out can just as well be considered ‘‘all at once.’’ Surely, within the next 100 years, much of the world we live in will be quite hot and may be unlivable, as Lovelock has predicted. Professor Ted Schuur, a professor of ecosystem ecology at the University of Florida and co-author of the study that appeared in Science, describes it as a ‘‘slow motion time bomb.’’ [21]. Permafrost under lakes will be released as methane while that which is under dry ground will be released as carbon dioxide. Scientists aren’t sure which is worse. Whereas methane is a much more powerful agent to trap heat, it only lasts for about 10 years before it dissipates into carbon dioxide or other chemicals. The less powerful heat-trapping agent, carbon dioxide, lasts for 100 years [21]. Both of the greenhouse gasses present in permafrost represent a global dilemma and challenge that compounds the effects of global warming and runaway climate change. The scary thing about it, as one researcher put it, is that there are ‘‘lots of mechanisms that tend to be self-perpetuating and relatively few that tend to shut it off’’ [21].14 In an accompanying AP article, Katey Walters of the University of Alaska at Fairbanks describes the effects as ‘‘huge’’ and, unless we have a ‘‘major cooling,’’ - unstoppable [22]. Also, there’s so much more that has not even been discovered yet, she writes: ‘‘It’s coming out a lot and there’s a lot more to come out.’’ [22]. 4. Is it the end of human civilization and possible extinction of humankind? What Jonathon Schell wrote concerning death by the fire of nuclear holocaust also applies to the slow burning death of global warming: Once we learn that a holocaust might lead to extinction, we have no right to gamble, because if we lose, the game will be over, and neither we nor anyone else will ever get another chance. Therefore, although, scientifically speaking, there is all the difference in the world between the mere possibility that a holocaust will bring about extinction and the certainty of it, morally they are the same, and we have no choice but to address the issue of nuclear weapons as though we knew for a certainty that their use would put an end to our species [23].15 When we consider that beyond the horror of nuclear war, another horror is set into motion to interact with the subsequent nuclear winter to produce a poisonous and super heated planet, the chances of human survival seem even smaller. Who knows, even if some small remnant does manage to survive, what the poisonous environmental conditions would have on human evolution in the future. A remnant of mutated, sub-human creatures might survive such harsh conditions, but for all purposes, human civilization has been destroyed, and the question concerning human extinction becomes moot. Thus, we have no other choice but to consider the finality of it all, as Schell does: ‘‘Death lies at the core of each person’s private existence, but part of death’s meaning is to be found in the fact that it occurs in a biological and social world that survives.’’ [23].16 But what if the world itself were to perish, Schell asks. Would not it bring about a sort of ‘‘second death’’ – the death of the species – a possibility that the vast majority of the human race is in denial about? Talbot writes in the review of Schell’s book that it is not only the ‘‘death of the species, not just of the earth’s population on doomsday, but of countless unborn generations. They would be spared literal death but would nonetheless be victims . . .’’ [23]. That is the ‘‘second death’’ of humanity – the horrifying, unthinkable prospect that there are no prospects – that there will be no future. In the second chapter of Schell’s book, he writes that since we have not made a positive decision to exterminate ourselves but instead have ‘‘chosen to live on the edge of extinction, periodically lunging toward the abyss only to draw back at the last second, our situation is one of uncertainty and nervous insecurity rather than of absolute hopelessness.’’ [23].17 In other words, the fate of the Earth and its inhabitants has not yet been determined. Yet time is not on our side. Will we relinquish the fire and our use of it to dominate the Earth and each other, or will we continue to gamble with our future at this game of Russian roulette while time increasingly stacks the cards against our chances of survival?